GHSA-c3gc-9pf2-84gg CVE-2026-44226 PYSEC-2026-2993
PyLoad vulnerable to unauthenticated traceback disclosure via global exception handler in WebUI
- Severity
- 5.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 27.07% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
- Fix
0.5.0b3.dev100- Upgrade pyload-ng to this version or later
Description
Summary
pyload-ng WebUI returns full Python traceback details to clients on unhandled exceptions.
Because /web/<path:filename> is reachable without authentication and renders attacker-controlled template names, an unauthenticated user can reliably trigger a server exception (for example by requesting a non-existent template) and receive internal stack traces in the HTTP response.
Details
The issue is caused by the combination of:
- Unauthenticated template-render route:
src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py:32-36@bp.route("/web/<path:filename>", endpoint="web")data = render_template(filename)with user-controlledfilename- no
@login_required(...)on this route
- Global exception handler exposes traceback to response:
src/pyload/webui/app/handlers.py:14-27tb = traceback.format_exc()messages.extend(tb.split('\n'))- returned in rendered error page for all exceptions
- Error page renders all
messages:
src/pyload/webui/app/themes/modern/templates/base.html:217-219- loops over
messagesand prints them in response HTML
- loops over
So any unhandled exception can disclose internal implementation details (stack frames, source paths, exception metadata) to remote unauthenticated clients.
This is a core behavior issue in default WebUI error handling
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import shutil
import tempfile
import traceback
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "pyload" / "src" / "pyload"
def read_text(rel: str) -> str:
return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def route_has_no_login_required(app_blueprint: str) -> bool:
m = re.search(
r'@bp\\.route\\("/web/<path:filename>", endpoint="web"\\)\\s*'
r"def render\\(filename\\):(?P<body>.*?)(?:\\n\\n@bp\\.route|\\Z)",
app_blueprint,
re.DOTALL,
)
if not m:
return False
block_start = max(0, m.start() - 200)
block = app_blueprint[block_start:m.end()]
return "@login_required(" not in block
def main() -> None:
workdir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="pyload-traceback-infoleak-"))
try:
app_blueprint = read_text("webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py")
handlers = read_text("webui/app/handlers.py")
base_template = read_text("webui/app/themes/modern/templates/base.html")
unauth_web_route = '/web/<path:filename>' in app_blueprint and route_has_no_login_required(app_blueprint)
user_controlled_template_name = "render_template(filename)" in app_blueprint
handler_uses_traceback = "traceback.format_exc()" in handlers
handler_appends_trace = "messages.extend(tb.split('\\n'))" in handlers
global_exception_handler = "(Exception, handle_exception_error)" in handlers
template_renders_messages = "{% for message in messages %}" in base_template and "{{message}}" in base_template
leaked_traceback_keyword = False
leaked_exception_type = False
try:
raise RuntimeError("forced-poc-error")
except Exception:
tb = traceback.format_exc()
messages = [f"Error 500: forced-poc-error"]
messages.extend(tb.split("\\n"))
joined = "\\n".join(messages)
leaked_traceback_keyword = "Traceback (most recent call last)" in joined
leaked_exception_type = "RuntimeError: forced-poc-error" in joined
repro_success = all(
[
unauth_web_route,
user_controlled_template_name,
handler_uses_traceback,
handler_appends_trace,
global_exception_handler,
template_renders_messages,
leaked_traceback_keyword,
leaked_exception_type,
]
)
print("unauth_web_route=", unauth_web_route)
print("user_controlled_template_name=", user_controlled_template_name)
print("handler_uses_traceback=", handler_uses_traceback)
print("handler_appends_trace=", handler_appends_trace)
print("global_exception_handler=", global_exception_handler)
print("template_renders_messages=", template_renders_messages)
print("leaked_traceback_keyword=", leaked_traceback_keyword)
print("leaked_exception_type=", leaked_exception_type)
print("traceback_infoleak_repro_success=", repro_success)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(workdir, ignore_errors=True)
print("cleanup_done=True")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Observed result:
unauth_web_route= True
user_controlled_template_name= True
handler_uses_traceback= True
handler_appends_trace= True
global_exception_handler= True
template_renders_messages= True
leaked_traceback_keyword= True
leaked_exception_type= True
traceback_infoleak_repro_success= True
cleanup_done=True
Impact
- Vulnerability type: Information disclosure (stack trace / internal path leakage).
- Attack surface: unauthenticated WebUI request path.
- Exposes internal error details that help attackers map application internals and improve exploit reliability for follow-on attacks.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pyload-ng | < 0.5.0b3.dev100 |
0.5.0b3.dev100 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
pyload-ng PyPI → 0.5.0b3.dev100
- pip
pip install --upgrade "pyload-ng>=0.5.0b3.dev100"- poetry
poetry add "pyload-ng>=0.5.0b3.dev100"- uv
uv add "pyload-ng>=0.5.0b3.dev100"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- Implementation: Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.
- Implementation: Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.
- Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
- Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
- System Configuration: Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.
- System Configuration: Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8 pyload-ng: getUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password | High | Also affects pyload-ng |
| GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8 pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header | Medium | Also affects pyload-ng |
| GHSA-jq7h-wrvp-3rgx pyLoad: Privilege revocation and password change through the REST API do not invalidate the user's session | High | Also affects pyload-ng |
| GHSA-889w-m37p-88m5 pyLoad: Api.set_user_permission never invalidates the target's session | High | Also affects pyload-ng |
| GHSA-p3pr-8f3m-4qp8 pyLoad WindowsPhoneNotify addon: non-admin SETTINGS user triggers SSRF via unguarded http.client notification host | Medium | Also affects pyload-ng |
| GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=) | High | Also affects pyload-ng |
| GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6 pyLoad has an authentication bypass in API key validation (check_apikey cache) | High | Also affects pyload-ng |
| GHSA-j92p-c242-7hfx pyLoad: Unauthenticated access to /web/<path:filename> bypasses authentication on sensitive templates and leaks internal error details via exception attribute typo | Medium | Also affects pyload-ng |
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