GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56 CVE-2026-61455 CVE-2026-61690
Grav: Decompression Bomb via ZipArchiver - Missing Extraction Limits
- Severity
- 7.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.53%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 44.87% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
- Fix
2.0.1- Upgrade getgrav/grav to this version or later
Description
Summary
ZipArchiver::extract() lacks limits on uncompressed size, file count, and nesting depth, creating a distinct, unpatched variant of the GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9 zip bomb vulnerability. While the parallel method Installer::unZip() received comprehensive limits, ZipArchiver::extract() remains unprotected, leaving a separate code path vulnerable to the same attack vector. The vulnerability is a distinct, unpatched variant of the bug described in GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9, as it affects a separate code path in the same codebase, implementing the same abstract class.
Details
Vulnerable code - system/src/Grav/Common/Filesystem/ZipArchiver.php:29-58:
public function extract($destination, ?callable $status = null)
{
$zip = new ZipArchive();
$archive = $zip->open($this->archive_file);
if ($archive === true) {
Folder::create($destination);
// Only guards against Zip Slip (path traversal)
for ($i = 0, $count = $zip->count(); $i < $count; $i++) {
$name = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
if ($name !== false && !$this->isSafeEntryPath($name)) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException(...);
}
}
// Extracts EVERYTHING — no size, count, or depth limit
if (!$zip->extractTo($destination)) { ... }
$zip->close();
return $this;
}
}
What's missing vs Installer::unZip():
| Protection | Installer::unZip() |
ZipArchiver::extract() |
|---|---|---|
| Zip Slip guard | ✅ | ✅ |
| Max uncompressed size | ✅ (1 GiB) | ❌ |
| Max file count | ✅ (50000) | ❌ |
| Max nesting depth | ✅ (48) | ❌ |
| Pre-extraction validation | ✅ All entries validated first | ❌ Extracts immediately |
The fix applied to Installer (GHSA-2vcx, Installer.php:178-269):
// GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9: bound what extractTo() will write to disk.
$limits = $this->archiveLimits();
$size = $count = $depth = 0;
for ($i = 0; $i < $numFiles; $i++) {
$entryName = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
// Check size, count, and depth BEFORE extracting anything
if ($limits['maxSize'] > 0) { $size += $entry['size']; }
if ($limits['maxDepth'] > 0) { ... }
if ($limits['maxFiles'] > 0) { $count++; }
// Reject if any limit exceeded
}
// Only now: $zip->extractTo($destination);
None of this validation exists in ZipArchiver::extract().
Reachability: ZipArchiver::extract() is a public method on a concrete class, accessible via the Archiver::create('zip') factory. While no first-party Grav code currently calls extract() on a ZipArchiver instance, third-party plugins and custom code that use the Archiver abstraction for ZIP restoration will walk directly into this unprotected path.
Proof of Concept
Step 1 - Create a zip bomb
# Create a 10 GB zip bomb (42 kB compressed)
python3 -c "
import zipfile, os
z = zipfile.ZipFile('/tmp/zipbomb.zip', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED)
zeros = b'\x00' * (1024 * 1024 * 1024) # 1 GB of zeros
for i in range(10):
z.writestr(f'file_{i}.txt', zeros)
z.close()
"
ls -lh /tmp/zipbomb.zip
# Output: 42K /tmp/zipbomb.zip → expands to 10 GB
Step 2 - Extract via ZipArchiver
$archiver = Archiver::create('zip');
$archiver->setArchive('/tmp/zipbomb.zip');
$archiver->extract('/tmp/extracted'); // ← no limits, fills disk
The server's disk fills with 10 GB of data. If the web root shares the disk, the site becomes unavailable (DoS).
Impact
Any code path that extracts a user-supplied ZIP archive through ZipArchiver::extract() will write the entire archive to disk without limits. A 42 KB zip bomb can expand to fill available disk space, causing denial of service. On systems where the extraction directory shares a partition with the web root, the entire site becomes unavailable.
Remediation
Apply the same archiveLimits() validation from Installer::unZip() to ZipArchiver::extract():
public function extract($destination, ?callable $status = null)
{
$zip = new ZipArchive();
$archive = $zip->open($this->archive_file);
if ($archive === true) {
Folder::create($destination);
// Apply the same archive limits as Installer::unZip()
$limits = $this->archiveLimits();
$totalSize = 0;
$totalFiles = 0;
for ($i = 0, $count = $zip->count(); $i < $count; $i++) {
$name = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
if ($name === false) continue;
// Zip Slip guard (existing)
if (!$this->isSafeEntryPath($name)) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException(...);
}
// Decompression bomb guards (NEW)
$stat = $zip->statIndex($i);
$totalSize += $stat['size'] ?? 0;
$totalFiles++;
$depth = count(explode('/', trim($name, '/')));
if ($limits['maxDepth'] > 0 && $depth > $limits['maxDepth']) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max nesting depth');
}
}
if ($limits['maxSize'] > 0 && $totalSize > $limits['maxSize']) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max uncompressed size');
}
if ($limits['maxFiles'] > 0 && $totalFiles > $limits['maxFiles']) {
$zip->close();
throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max file count');
}
if (!$zip->extractTo($destination)) { ... }
$zip->close();
return $this;
}
}
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| getgrav/grav | < 2.0.1 |
2.0.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
getgrav/grav Packagist → 2.0.1
- composer
composer require getgrav/grav:^2.0.1
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 7.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled | High | Also affects getgrav/grav |
| GHSA-3jhr-mxmx-38cx Grav: UserInterface offsetget/offsetexists allow-listed in Twig sandbox let editor-authored content leak hashed_password and 2FA secrets via offsetGet() | Medium | Also affects getgrav/grav |
| GHSA-9ccq-2jfg-qw33 Grav: Origin validation bypass in Uri::referrer() and Pages::referrerRoute() via unanchored prefix match | Critical | Also affects getgrav/grav |
| GHSA-38p6-h87p-r4cg Grav: Non constant time nonce comparison in Utils::verifyNonce() used for CSRF protection | Medium | Also affects getgrav/grav |
| GHSA-p597-crqc-m349 Grav: The system, site, and theme Twig variables bypass the content sandbox entirely and are never covered by config_denied_paths | Medium | Also affects getgrav/grav |
| GHSA-47ch-6w46-6xm7 Grav: media_directory() Twig function allows filesystem path traversal and file content disclosure from sandboxed page content | Medium | Also affects getgrav/grav |
| GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55 Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion | High | Also affects getgrav/grav |
| GHSA-8hgv-xc77-jmcr Grav: Page editors can inject arbitrary script into rendered pages via the Twig sandbox's assets.addJs/addCss allowlist, escalating to super-admin | Medium | Also affects getgrav/grav |
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