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GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56 CVE-2026-61455 CVE-2026-61690

Grav: Decompression Bomb via ZipArchiver - Missing Extraction Limits

High Packagist
Severity
7.1 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.53%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 44.87% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
Fix
2.0.1
Upgrade getgrav/grav to this version or later

Description

Summary

ZipArchiver::extract() lacks limits on uncompressed size, file count, and nesting depth, creating a distinct, unpatched variant of the GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9 zip bomb vulnerability. While the parallel method Installer::unZip() received comprehensive limits, ZipArchiver::extract() remains unprotected, leaving a separate code path vulnerable to the same attack vector. The vulnerability is a distinct, unpatched variant of the bug described in GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9, as it affects a separate code path in the same codebase, implementing the same abstract class.


Details

Vulnerable code - system/src/Grav/Common/Filesystem/ZipArchiver.php:29-58:

public function extract($destination, ?callable $status = null)
{
    $zip = new ZipArchive();
    $archive = $zip->open($this->archive_file);

    if ($archive === true) {
        Folder::create($destination);

        // Only guards against Zip Slip (path traversal)
        for ($i = 0, $count = $zip->count(); $i < $count; $i++) {
            $name = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
            if ($name !== false && !$this->isSafeEntryPath($name)) {
                $zip->close();
                throw new RuntimeException(...);
            }
        }

        // Extracts EVERYTHING — no size, count, or depth limit
        if (!$zip->extractTo($destination)) { ... }

        $zip->close();
        return $this;
    }
}

What's missing vs Installer::unZip():

Protection Installer::unZip() ZipArchiver::extract()
Zip Slip guard ✅ ✅
Max uncompressed size ✅ (1 GiB) ❌
Max file count ✅ (50000) ❌
Max nesting depth ✅ (48) ❌
Pre-extraction validation ✅ All entries validated first ❌ Extracts immediately

The fix applied to Installer (GHSA-2vcx, Installer.php:178-269):

// GHSA-2vcx-h8p2-9pg9: bound what extractTo() will write to disk.
$limits = $this->archiveLimits();
$size = $count = $depth = 0;

for ($i = 0; $i < $numFiles; $i++) {
    $entryName = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
    // Check size, count, and depth BEFORE extracting anything
    if ($limits['maxSize'] > 0) { $size += $entry['size']; }
    if ($limits['maxDepth'] > 0) { ... }
    if ($limits['maxFiles'] > 0) { $count++; }
    // Reject if any limit exceeded
}
// Only now: $zip->extractTo($destination);

None of this validation exists in ZipArchiver::extract().

Reachability: ZipArchiver::extract() is a public method on a concrete class, accessible via the Archiver::create('zip') factory. While no first-party Grav code currently calls extract() on a ZipArchiver instance, third-party plugins and custom code that use the Archiver abstraction for ZIP restoration will walk directly into this unprotected path.


Proof of Concept

Step 1 - Create a zip bomb

# Create a 10 GB zip bomb (42 kB compressed)
python3 -c "
import zipfile, os
z = zipfile.ZipFile('/tmp/zipbomb.zip', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED)
zeros = b'\x00' * (1024 * 1024 * 1024)  # 1 GB of zeros
for i in range(10):
    z.writestr(f'file_{i}.txt', zeros)
z.close()
"
ls -lh /tmp/zipbomb.zip
# Output: 42K /tmp/zipbomb.zip  →  expands to 10 GB

Step 2 - Extract via ZipArchiver

$archiver = Archiver::create('zip');
$archiver->setArchive('/tmp/zipbomb.zip');
$archiver->extract('/tmp/extracted');  // ← no limits, fills disk

The server's disk fills with 10 GB of data. If the web root shares the disk, the site becomes unavailable (DoS).


Impact

Any code path that extracts a user-supplied ZIP archive through ZipArchiver::extract() will write the entire archive to disk without limits. A 42 KB zip bomb can expand to fill available disk space, causing denial of service. On systems where the extraction directory shares a partition with the web root, the entire site becomes unavailable.


Remediation

Apply the same archiveLimits() validation from Installer::unZip() to ZipArchiver::extract():

public function extract($destination, ?callable $status = null)
{
    $zip = new ZipArchive();
    $archive = $zip->open($this->archive_file);

    if ($archive === true) {
        Folder::create($destination);

        // Apply the same archive limits as Installer::unZip()
        $limits = $this->archiveLimits();
        $totalSize = 0;
        $totalFiles = 0;

        for ($i = 0, $count = $zip->count(); $i < $count; $i++) {
            $name = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
            if ($name === false) continue;

            // Zip Slip guard (existing)
            if (!$this->isSafeEntryPath($name)) {
                $zip->close();
                throw new RuntimeException(...);
            }

            // Decompression bomb guards (NEW)
            $stat = $zip->statIndex($i);
            $totalSize += $stat['size'] ?? 0;
            $totalFiles++;

            $depth = count(explode('/', trim($name, '/')));
            if ($limits['maxDepth'] > 0 && $depth > $limits['maxDepth']) {
                $zip->close();
                throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max nesting depth');
            }
        }

        if ($limits['maxSize'] > 0 && $totalSize > $limits['maxSize']) {
            $zip->close();
            throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max uncompressed size');
        }
        if ($limits['maxFiles'] > 0 && $totalFiles > $limits['maxFiles']) {
            $zip->close();
            throw new RuntimeException('Archive exceeds max file count');
        }

        if (!$zip->extractTo($destination)) { ... }
        $zip->close();
        return $this;
    }
}

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
getgrav/grav
< 2.0.1
2.0.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

getgrav/grav Packagist → 2.0.1

composer
composer require getgrav/grav:^2.0.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 7.1

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr
Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled
High Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-3jhr-mxmx-38cx
Grav: UserInterface offsetget/offsetexists allow-listed in Twig sandbox let editor-authored content leak hashed_password and 2FA secrets via offsetGet()
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-9ccq-2jfg-qw33
Grav: Origin validation bypass in Uri::referrer() and Pages::referrerRoute() via unanchored prefix match
Critical Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-38p6-h87p-r4cg
Grav: Non constant time nonce comparison in Utils::verifyNonce() used for CSRF protection
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-p597-crqc-m349
Grav: The system, site, and theme Twig variables bypass the content sandbox entirely and are never covered by config_denied_paths
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-47ch-6w46-6xm7
Grav: media_directory() Twig function allows filesystem path traversal and file content disclosure from sandboxed page content
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55
Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
High Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-8hgv-xc77-jmcr
Grav: Page editors can inject arbitrary script into rendered pages via the Twig sandbox's assets.addJs/addCss allowlist, escalating to super-admin
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
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