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GHSA-8g75-q649-6pv6 CVE-2026-32921

OpenClaw's system.run approvals did not bind mutable script operands across approval and execution

Medium npm
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.20%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 10.33% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-285 Improper Authorization
CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Fix
2026.3.8
Upgrade openclaw to this version or later

Description

OpenClaw's system.run approval flow did not bind mutable interpreter-style script operands across approval and execution.

A caller could obtain approval for an execution such as sh ./script.sh, rewrite the approved script before execution, and then execute different content under the previously approved command shape. The approved argv values remained the same, but the mutable script operand content could drift after approval.

Latest published npm version verified vulnerable: 2026.3.7

The initial March 7, 2026 fix in c76d29208bf6a7f058d2cf582519d28069e42240 added approval binding for shell scripts and a narrow interpreter set, but follow-up maintainer review on March 8, 2026 found that bun and deno script operands still did not produce mutableFileOperand snapshots.

A complete fix shipped on March 9, 2026 in cf3a479bd1204f62eef7dd82b4aa328749ae6c91, which binds approved bun and deno run script operands to on-disk file snapshots and denies post-approval script drift before execution.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.7
  • Patched version: 2026.3.8

Fix Commit(s)

  • c76d29208bf6a7f058d2cf582519d28069e42240
  • cf3a479bd1204f62eef7dd82b4aa328749ae6c91

Release Verification

  • npm 2026.3.7 remains vulnerable.
  • npm 2026.3.8 contains the completed fix.

Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
openclaw
< 2026.3.8
2026.3.8

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openclaw npm → 2026.3.8

npm
npm install openclaw@2026.3.8
yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.3.8
pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.3.8

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 5.3

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
Low
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 6.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-285: Improper Authorization

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the false sense of security given by the check.
  • Implementation: When the file being altered is owned by the current user and group, set the effective gid and uid to that of the current user and group when executing this statement.
  • Architecture and Design: Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: If you cannot perform operations atomically and you must share access to the resource between multiple processes or threads, then try to limit the amount of time (CPU cycles) between the check and use of the resource. This will not fix the problem, but it could make it more difficult for an attack to succeed.
  • Implementation: Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that some environmental locking mechanism can be used to protect resources effectively.
  • Implementation: Ensure that locking occurs before the check, as opposed to afterwards, such that the resource, as checked, is the same as it is when in use.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-3x84-qq85-fj65
OpenClaw: Browser CDP discovery could accept blocked WebSocket URLs
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-9c3v-684m-579c
OpenClaw MCP SSE redirects could forward Authorization headers
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-f397-5vjw-v2c2
OpenClaw: Shell inline-command parsing could miss an allowlist check
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-rx78-29qr-5hq8
OpenClaw: Workspace-derived service PATH could influence trash command selection
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-ccwh-wwpp-6wg5
OpenClaw: Host environment sanitizer missed two Node.js control variables
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-985f-72mj-8gf7
OpenClaw: Tool group policy callers could accept unvalidated group IDs
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c
OpenClaw: Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopes
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-c226-q6fx-6j6c
OpenClaw: macOS Swift exec allowlist missed combined POSIX inline flags
Medium Also affects openclaw
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