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GHSA-89v6-j5x6-cmj3 CVE-2026-52763

YesWiki: SQL injection via the `recentchanges` action `period` argument leads to arbitrary DB read

Medium Packagist
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.38%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 31.96% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1287 Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Fix
4.6.6
Upgrade yeswiki/yeswiki to this version or later

Description

Summary

The recentchanges action (actions/recentchanges.php) accepts a period argument from two disjoint parameter spaces: the URL query string ($_GET['period']) and the action invocation {{recentchanges period="..."}}. A whitelist at line 17 validates only the URL form against ['day','week','month']. The action-argument form takes the else branch at line 33 ($dateMin = $this->GetParameter('period')) with no validation, and the value flows into PageManager::getRecentlyChanged() (includes/services/PageManager.php:196), where it is interpolated into a WHERE time >= '...' ORDER BY time DESC clause without escaping or parameterization. UNION-based injection succeeds, the leaked rows render into the response page via actions/recentchanges.php:43,58 (ComposeLinkToPage($page['tag'])), so any visitor of the trigger page sees the exfiltrated data.

The vulnerability provides arbitrary read of the YesWiki database to anyone who can save the trigger page. On a default install (default_write_acl='*'), this includes anonymous users, subject to the hashcash JS check on the page-edit form. Once the trigger page is saved, every subsequent view fires the injection as the SQLi is stored. Stored SQL injection is reachable through the page-edit flow, with arbitrary database read.

Details

Two issues compose the vulnerability.

  1. actions/recentchanges.php line 33 reads the action argument and skips the whitelist.

    if (isset($_GET['period']) && in_array($_GET['period'], ['day', 'week', 'month'])) {
        switch ($_GET['period']) {
            case 'day':   $d = strtotime('-1 day');   $dateMin = date('Y-m-d H:i:s', $d); break;
            case 'week':  $d = strtotime('-1 week');  $dateMin = date('Y-m-d H:i:s', $d); break;
            case 'month': $d = strtotime('-1 month'); $dateMin = date('Y-m-d H:i:s', $d); break;
        }
    } else {
        $dateMin = $this->GetParameter('period');   
    }
    

    Wiki::GetParameter() (includes/YesWiki.php:895) reads $this->parameter[$key], which is populated from the {{action key=value}} argument list — disjoint from $_GET. The whitelist's if branch only runs when $_GET['period'] matches one of three exact values; in every other case the else branch reads the action argument with no validation, no escaping, no DateTime parse, no regex. The two parameter spaces are independent.

  2. In includes/services/PageManager.php, PageManager::getRecentlyChanged() interpolates the value into SQL.

public function getRecentlyChanged($limit = 50, $minDate = ''): ?array
{
    if (!empty($minDate)) {
        if ($pages = $this->dbService->loadAll(
            'select id, tag, time, user, owner from' . $this->dbService->prefixTable('pages')
            . "where latest = 'Y' and comment_on = '' and time >= '$minDate' order by time desc"
        )) {
            return $pages;
        }
    }
}

$minDate is interpolated raw into the query and there is no $this->dbService->escape($minDate) and no parameter binding and no format check.

The default action ACL for recentchanges is * (includes/YesWiki.php:1100, GetModuleACL), so Performer::CheckModuleACL('recentchanges', 'action') returns true for everyone. The injection runs whenever a viewer reaches a page that embeds the action with a malicious period argument.

PoC

Default fresh install so default_write_acl='*'.

  1. place the SQLi payload on a page
{{recentchanges period="2000-01-01' UNION SELECT 9999 AS id, CONCAT('LEAK_', name, '_', SUBSTRING(password,1,32)) AS tag, NOW() AS time, name AS user, name AS owner FROM yeswiki_users WHERE name='AdminUser' -- "}}

The five UNION columns match the id, tag, time, user, owner projection that getRecentlyChanged selects. The tag column is rendered into the response as a hyperlink, exfiltrating the leaked data.

  1. anyone visits the page
GET /?<TriggerPage> HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example

The injected query executes server-side; the tag column is rendered into the page in actions/recentchanges.php:43,58 via ComposeLinkToPage($page['tag']).

Impact

Arbitrary read of any DB column the application's MySQL user can access.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
yeswiki/yeswiki
< 4.6.6
4.6.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

yeswiki/yeswiki Packagist → 4.6.6

composer
composer require yeswiki/yeswiki:^4.6.6

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input

The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
  • Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations. Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88). Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the data
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-9369-69wj-7m2f
YesWiki Vulnerable to Authenticated PHP Object Injection in BazarImportAction via unserialize
Critical Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
GHSA-4pf7-cc4r-g63h
YesWiki has Authenticated SQL Injection via ReactionManager
High Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
GHSA-r5xw-gcgw-hwp5
YesWiki Vulnerable to Reflected XSS via Unescaped `id` Parameter in Bazar Widget HTML Attributes
Medium Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
GHSA-35f3-pg38-486f
YesWiki Vulnerable to Reflected XSS via Unescaped Archived-Revision `time` Parameter in `handlers/page/show.php`
Medium Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
GHSA-xc7j-3g8q-9vh4
YesWiki has stored XSS in Bazar form-field templates via unescaped field.label / field.hint (|raw('html'))
Medium Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
GHSA-8f2v-2qhj-gfwg
YesWiki: Second-Order SQL Injection in Page Delete API via Unescaped Page Tag (`ApiController::deletePage`)
High Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
GHSA-qg78-vmvc-fhjw
YesWiki: SQL Injection possible through public Bazar entry-listing APIs via numeric `query`/`queries` filters
High Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
GHSA-vw42-752g-5mrp
YesWiki has Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery via ActivityPub `Signature.keyId`
High Also affects yeswiki/yeswiki
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