Skip to content

GHSA-782p-5fr5-7fj8 CVE-2026-24764

OpenClaw Affected by Remote Code Execution via System Prompt Injection in Slack Channel Descriptions

Low npm
Severity
3.7 / 10
Low · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.24%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 14.99% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Fix
2026.2.3
Upgrade openclaw to this version or later

Description

Summary

When the Slack integration is enabled, Slack channel metadata (topic/description) could be incorporated into the model's system prompt.

Impact

Prompt injection is a documented risk for LLM-driven systems. This issue increased the injection surface by allowing untrusted Slack channel metadata to be treated as higher-trust system input.

This is relevant only for deployments that enable Slack. In deployments where tool execution is enabled, a successful injection could lead to unintended tool invocations and/or unintended data exposure.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • npm: openclaw < 2026.2.3

Patched Versions

  • npm: openclaw >= 2026.2.3

Mitigation

  • If you do not use Slack: no action required.
  • If you use Slack: upgrade to a patched version.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 35eb40a7000b59085e9c638a80fd03917c7a095e

Thanks @KonstantinMirin for reporting.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
openclaw
< 2026.2.3
2026.2.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openclaw npm → 2026.2.3

npm
npm install openclaw@2026.2.3
yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.2.3
pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.2.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 3.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Programming languages and supporting technologies might be chosen which are not subject to these issues.
  • Implementation: Utilize an appropriate mix of allowlist and denylist parsing to filter control-plane syntax from all input.

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
  • Architecture and Design: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
  • Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-3x84-qq85-fj65
OpenClaw: Browser CDP discovery could accept blocked WebSocket URLs
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-9c3v-684m-579c
OpenClaw MCP SSE redirects could forward Authorization headers
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-f397-5vjw-v2c2
OpenClaw: Shell inline-command parsing could miss an allowlist check
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-rx78-29qr-5hq8
OpenClaw: Workspace-derived service PATH could influence trash command selection
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-ccwh-wwpp-6wg5
OpenClaw: Host environment sanitizer missed two Node.js control variables
High Also affects openclaw
GHSA-985f-72mj-8gf7
OpenClaw: Tool group policy callers could accept unvalidated group IDs
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c
OpenClaw: Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopes
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-c226-q6fx-6j6c
OpenClaw: macOS Swift exec allowlist missed combined POSIX inline flags
Medium Also affects openclaw
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor