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GHSA-73x5-h92w-xc2j CVE-2026-59215 PYSEC-2026-3591

Open WebUI: Private channel messages can be disclosed through cross-channel thread parent_id binding

Low PyPI
Severity
3.1 / 10
Low · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.32%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.38% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Fix
0.10.0
Upgrade open-webui to this version or later

Description

Summary

A normal authenticated user can read the content of a message in a private channel they do not belong to. GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/{message_id}/thread authorizes the caller against the URL channel, but the underlying thread lookup loads the thread parent by id and returns it without verifying the parent belongs to that channel. By requesting a thread in a channel they can access while supplying a victim channel's message id as the thread root, the attacker receives the victim message — content, channel id, and author.

Affected component

  • backend/open_webui/models/messages.py — get_messages_by_parent_id()
  • backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py — get_channel_thread_messages() (read), new_message_handler() (parent/reply binding on write)

Root cause

get_messages_by_parent_id(channel_id, parent_id) filters the thread replies by channel_id, but loads the thread parent by id alone and appends it without requiring parent.channel_id == channel_id:

message = await db.get(Message, parent_id)     # loaded by id only — no channel binding
if not message:
    return []
# replies are filtered by channel_id ...
if len(all_messages) < limit:
    all_messages.append(message)               # parent appended unconditionally

get_channel_thread_messages() authorizes only the URL channel, then calls get_messages_by_parent_id(id, message_id) with the caller-supplied message_id. The reply insert path (new_message_handler → insert_new_message) also stored a caller-supplied parent_id without binding it to the channel.

Impact

A non-member can disclose the content (plus channel id and author metadata) of a private-channel message whose id they know or obtain. Direct reads of the victim channel/message/thread return 403; the disclosure is via the thread parent of a channel the attacker can access. Read-only, one message per known id.

Proof of Concept

(reporter) Validated on v0.9.6: GET /channels/{attacker_channel}/messages/{victim_message_id}/thread returned the victim's private message — content, victim channel id, and author — although direct reads of the victim channel returned 403.

Fix

Bind the thread parent to the requested channel: get_messages_by_parent_id returns [] unless the parent exists and parent.channel_id == channel_id. Defence-in-depth on the write path: new_message_handler rejects a supplied parent_id/reply_to_id whose message does not belong to the URL channel.

Affected / Patched

  • Affected: < 0.10.0 (last affected release 0.9.6)
  • Patched: v0.10.0 (PR #25766). get_messages_by_parent_id binds the thread parent to the requested channel (returns [] unless parent.channel_id == channel_id), and new_message_handler rejects a caller-supplied parent_id/reply_to_id whose message does not belong to the channel.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
open-webui
< 0.10.0
0.10.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

open-webui PyPI → 0.10.0

pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.10.0"
poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.10.0"
uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.10.0"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 3.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
  • Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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Medium Also affects open-webui
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