GHSA-72x9-48mc-phh6 CVE-2022-37023
Apache Geode versions prior to 1.15.0 are vulnerable to a deserialization of untrusted data
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 1.78%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 78.28% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- Fix
1.15.0- Upgrade org.apache.geode:geode-core to this version or later
Description
Apache Geode versions prior to 1.15.0 are vulnerable to a deserialization of untrusted data flaw when using REST API on Java 8 or Java 11. Any user wishing to protect against deserialization attacks involving REST APIs should upgrade to Apache Geode 1.15 and follow the documentation for details on enabling "validate-serializable-objects=true" and specifying any user classes that may be serialized/deserialized with "serializable-object-filter". Enabling "validate-serializable-objects" may impact performance.
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| org.apache.geode:geode-core | < 1.15.0 |
1.15.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
org.apache.geode:geode-core Maven → 1.15.0
- maven
<dependency><groupId>org.apache.geode</groupId><artifactId>geode-core</artifactId><version>1.15.0</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("org.apache.geode:geode-core:1.15.0")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-373r-9mg8-3jc4 Apache Geode vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting | Medium | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
| GHSA-qf8g-vpwp-6579 Apache Geode versions deserialization of untrusted datawhen using JMX over RMI on Java 11 | High | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
| GHSA-q4q3-r45f-7gwg Apache Geode vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data | Critical | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
| GHSA-2gw6-73wc-x88f Apache Geode information disclosure vulnerability | High | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
| GHSA-37m3-qp37-x3c6 Apache Geode gfsh query vulnerability | Medium | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
| GHSA-h22r-h77w-2g5f Apache Geode gfsh authorization vulnerability | High | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
| GHSA-q7cp-r6cj-hpf5 Apache Geode OQL bind parameter vulnerability | Medium | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
| GHSA-g569-49wg-jx5f Apache Geode configuration request authorization vulnerability | High | Also affects org.apache.geode:geode-core |
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