Skip to content

GHSA-6xmv-mx7q-789r CVE-2018-8456

ChakraCore RCE Vulnerability

High NuGet
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
14.95%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 96.71% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write
Fix
1.11.1
Upgrade Microsoft.ChakraCore to this version or later

Description

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that the ChakraCore scripting engine handles objects in memory, aka "Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability." This affects Microsoft Edge, ChakraCore. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2018-8354, CVE-2018-8391, CVE-2018-8457, CVE-2018-8459.

Affected versions

NuGet

PackageVulnerableFixed in
Microsoft.ChakraCore
< 1.11.1
1.11.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

Microsoft.ChakraCore NuGet → 1.11.1

dotnet
dotnet add package Microsoft.ChakraCore --version 1.11.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 7.5

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
  • Implementation: Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory: Double check that the buffer is as large as specified. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
  • Operation: Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment. For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
  • Implementation: Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-5whg-j5fv-xcm2
ChakraCore RCE Vulnerability
High Known exploited Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
GHSA-4f5g-j7wg-7w8j
ChakraCore RCE Vulnerability
High Known exploited Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
CVE-2018-8298
ChakraCore RCE Vulnerability
High Known exploited Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
GHSA-vvvh-5xrm-pxff
ChakraCore information disclosure vulnerability
High Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
GHSA-v8jw-x9wq-hw4v
Chakra Scripting Engine RCE via Out-of-bounds write
High Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
GHSA-g8q3-rcf9-qx4q
Chakra Scripting Engine RCE Vulnerability
High Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
GHSA-fxrx-5j36-pwg5
Chakra Scripting Engine RCE via Out-of-bounds write
High Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
GHSA-4v6q-gjm6-6vv4
ChakraCore RCE via Out-of-bounds write
High Also affects Microsoft.ChakraCore
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor