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GHSA-66hx-chf7-3332 CVE-2026-41133 PYSEC-2026-2990

pyLoad has Stale Session Privilege After Role/Permission Change (Privilege Revocation Bypass)

High PyPI
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.33%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.62% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Summary

pyLoad caches role and permission in the session at login and continues to authorize requests using these cached values, even after an admin changes the user's role/permissions in the database.

As a result, an already logged-in user can keep old (revoked) privileges until logout/session expiry, enabling continued privileged actions.

This is a core authorization/session-consistency issue and is not resolved by toggling an optional security feature.

Details

The WebUI auth flow stores authorization state in session:

  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:187-200
    • set_session(...) writes:
      • "role": user_info["role"]
      • "perms": user_info["permission"]

Authorization checks later trust cached session values:

  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:134-151
    • parse_permissions(...) reads session.get("role") / session.get("perms")
  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:225-230
    • is_authenticated(...) only verifies authenticated and api.user_exists(user) (existence), not fresh role/permission
  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:267-275
    • login_required(...) uses parse_permissions(s) for allow/deny decisions
  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:356-365
    • API session auth path also trusts s["role"] and s["perms"]

Role/permission updates are written to DB but active sessions are not invalidated/refreshed:

  • src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:389-434
    • update_users(...) calls api.set_user_permission(...) and returns
  • src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1643-1645
    • set_user_permission(...) updates DB role/permission only

Default exposure window is long:

  • src/pyload/core/config/default.cfg:47
    • session_lifetime = 44640 minutes (~31 days)

Therefore, privilege revocation is not enforced immediately for active sessions.

Note on duplicates:

  • This appears distinct from CVE-2023-0227 (session validity after user deletion) because this report is about stale authorization after role/permission changes while the user still exists.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Repro: stale session privilege after role/permission changes.

This PoC is source-based and leaves no persistent state.
It validates that:
1) Role/permission are cached into session at login.
2) Authorization checks read role/permission from session, not fresh DB values.
3) User updates write DB permission/role without invalidating active sessions.
4) Default session lifetime is long, increasing stale-privilege exposure window.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import pathlib
import re
from typing import Iterable


ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "pyload" / "src" / "pyload"


def read(rel: str) -> str:
    return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding="utf-8")


def has_any(text: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -> bool:
    return all(re.search(p, text, re.MULTILINE) for p in patterns)


def main() -> None:
    helpers = read("webui/app/helpers.py")
    json_blueprint = read("webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py")
    api_init = read("core/api/__init__.py")
    default_cfg = (ROOT / "core/config/default.cfg").read_text(encoding="utf-8")

    checks = {
        "set_session_caches_role_perms": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+set_session\\(',
                r'"role"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["role"\\]',
                r'"perms"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["permission"\\]',
            ],
        ),
        "is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+is_authenticated\\(',
                r'api\\s*=\\s*flask\\.current_app\\.config\\["PYLOAD_API"\\]',
                r'return\\s+authenticated\\s+and\\s+api\\.user_exists\\(user\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "parse_permissions_reads_session_cache": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+parse_permissions\\(',
                r'session\\.get\\("role"\\)\\s*==\\s*Role\\.ADMIN',
                r'session\\.get\\("perms"\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+login_required\\(',
                r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
                r'perms\\s*=\\s*parse_permissions\\(s\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
                r'"role"\\s*:\\s*s\\["role"\\]',
                r'"permission"\\s*:\\s*s\\["perms"\\]',
            ],
        ),
        "update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation": has_any(
            json_blueprint,
            [
                r'def\\s+update_users\\(',
                r'api\\.set_user_permission\\(name,\\s*data\\["permission"\\],\\s*data\\["role"\\]\\)',
                r'return\\s+jsonify\\(True\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "set_user_permission_only_updates_db": has_any(
            api_init,
            [
                r'def\\s+set_user_permission\\(',
                r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_permission\\(user,\\s*permission\\)',
                r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_role\\(user,\\s*role\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "default_session_lifetime_long": re.search(
            r'session_lifetime\\s*:\\s*"Session lifetime \\(minutes\\)"\\s*=\\s*44640',
            default_cfg,
            re.MULTILINE,
        )
        is not None,
    }

    for name, ok in checks.items():
        print(f"{name}={ok}")

    stale_privilege_repro_success = all(checks.values())
    print(f"stale_privilege_repro_success={stale_privilege_repro_success}")

    # Cleanup: this PoC creates/modifies no runtime/data files.
    print("cleanup_done=True")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
set_session_caches_role_perms=True
is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists=True
parse_permissions_reads_session_cache=True
login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session=True
api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms=True
update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation=True
set_user_permission_only_updates_db=True
default_session_lifetime_long=True
stale_privilege_repro_success=True
cleanup_done=True

Impact

  • Privilege revocation is not immediate for active sessions.
  • A user can continue using stale, previously granted privileges (including admin) after downgrade/restriction.
  • This can allow continued access to privileged WebUI/API actions until session expiry or manual logout/session reset.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pyload-ng
<= 0.5.0b3.dev97
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration

According to WASC, "Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization."

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Set sessions/credentials expiration date.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8
pyload-ng: getUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8
pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-jq7h-wrvp-3rgx
pyLoad: Privilege revocation and password change through the REST API do not invalidate the user's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-889w-m37p-88m5
pyLoad: Api.set_user_permission never invalidates the target's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-p3pr-8f3m-4qp8
pyLoad WindowsPhoneNotify addon: non-admin SETTINGS user triggers SSRF via unguarded http.client notification host
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c
pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6
pyLoad has an authentication bypass in API key validation (check_apikey cache)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-j92p-c242-7hfx
pyLoad: Unauthenticated access to /web/<path:filename> bypasses authentication on sensitive templates and leaks internal error details via exception attribute typo
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
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