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GHSA-638m-m8mh-7gw2 CVE-2022-1434 RUSTSEC-2022-0026

Incorrect MAC key used in the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite

Medium crates.io
Severity
5.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.23%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 68.90% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Fix
300.0.6
Upgrade openssl-src to this version or later

Description

The OpenSSL 3.0 implementation of the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite incorrectly uses the AAD data as the MAC key. This makes the MAC key trivially predictable. An attacker could exploit this issue by performing a man-in-the-middle attack to modify data being sent from one endpoint to an OpenSSL 3.0 recipient such that the modified data would still pass the MAC integrity check. Note that data sent from an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint to a non-OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint will always be rejected by the recipient and the connection will fail at that point. Many application protocols require data to be sent from the client to the server first. Therefore, in such a case, only an OpenSSL 3.0 server would be impacted when talking to a non-OpenSSL 3.0 client. If both endpoints are OpenSSL 3.0 then the attacker could modify data being sent in both directions. In this case both clients and servers could be affected, regardless of the application protocol. Note that in the absence of an attacker this bug means that an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint communicating with a non-OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint will fail to complete the handshake when using this ciphersuite. The confidentiality of data is not impacted by this issue, i.e. an attacker cannot decrypt data that has been encrypted using this ciphersuite - they can only modify it. In order for this attack to work both endpoints must legitimately negotiate the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite. This ciphersuite is not compiled by default in OpenSSL 3.0, and is not available within the default provider or the default ciphersuite list. This ciphersuite will never be used if TLSv1.3 has been negotiated. In order for an OpenSSL 3.0 endpoint to use this ciphersuite the following must have occurred: 1) OpenSSL must have been compiled with the (non-default) compile time option enable-weak-ssl-ciphers 2) OpenSSL must have had the legacy provider explicitly loaded (either through application code or via configuration) 3) The ciphersuite must have been explicitly added to the ciphersuite list 4) The libssl security level must have been set to 0 (default is 1) 5) A version of SSL/TLS below TLSv1.3 must have been negotiated 6) Both endpoints must negotiate the RC4-MD5 ciphersuite in preference to any others that both endpoints have in common Fixed in OpenSSL 3.0.3 (Affected 3.0.0,3.0.1,3.0.2).

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
openssl-src
>= 300.0.0, < 300.0.6
300.0.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openssl-src crates.io → 300.0.6

cargo
cargo update -p openssl-src --precise 300.0.6

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis. For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192]. Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak. Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
  • Architecture and Design: Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-w67w-mw4j-8qrv
openssl-src contains Read Buffer Overflow in X.509 Name Constraint
Medium Also affects openssl-src
GHSA-vrh7-x64v-7vxq
openssl-src contains `NULL` dereference during PKCS7 data verification
High Also affects openssl-src
GHSA-vxrh-cpg7-8vjr
openssl-src subject to NULL dereference validating DSA public key
High Also affects openssl-src
GHSA-r7jw-wp68-3xch
openssl-src vulnerable to Use-after-free following `BIO_new_NDEF`
High Also affects openssl-src
GHSA-v5w6-wcm8-jm4q
openssl-src contains Double free after calling `PEM_read_bio_ex`
High Also affects openssl-src
GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4
openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
Medium Also affects openssl-src
GHSA-29xx-hcv2-c4cp
openssl-src subject to Invalid pointer dereference in `d2i_PKCS7` functions
High Also affects openssl-src
GHSA-x4qr-2fvf-3mr5
Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels
High Also affects openssl-src
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