GHSA-5wx6-mg75-v57r CVE-2026-55487
pnpm: Manifest identity spoof satisfies allowBuilds and runs attacker lifecycle
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.18%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 7.67% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-346 Origin Validation Error
- CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure
- CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
- Fix
10.34.2- Upgrade pnpm to this version or later
Description
Summary
Keep build approval for opaque dependency sources byte-exact for GHSA-5wx6-mg75-v57r / CAND-PNPM-123.
Merged upstream commit bf1b731ee6 fixed the original name-only approval bypass by making build policy consume the resolved dependency identity. One collision remained: the generic peer-suffix normalizer also stripped parenthesized text from git, URL, tarball, file, and other opaque locators. Approval for one source string could therefore authorize a different attacker-controlled source whose locator normalized to the same value.
Security boundary
- Registry dependency identities still normalize legitimate peer suffixes and retain patch hashes.
- Git, URL, tarball, file, directory, and otherwise opaque identities must match the complete resolved locator byte for byte.
- Explicit denials use the same normalization as approvals.
- Ignored-build output preserves the exact opaque identity, so the key pnpm asks a user to approve is the key policy later checks.
- TypeScript pnpm and pacquet implement the same distinction between registry and opaque identities.
Exploit replay
- With
allowBuildsapprovingfoo@https://host/pkg.tgz, the upstream implementation also acceptedfoo@https://host/pkg.tgz(evil)because both passed through peer-suffix removal. - An independent review found a second Rust-only form:
foo@https://host/pkg@1.0.0(good)andfoo@https://host/pkg@1.0.0(evil)collided because the parser selected the final@and misclassified the opaque URL as a registry package. - A final review found the same parser hazard in source-only locators ending in a semver-looking tail: approval for
https://host/pkg@1.0.0could collapsehttps://host/pkg@1.0.0(evil). - The final patch rejects all three collision forms, applies the same exactness to deny rules, accepts exact opaque keys as positive controls, and continues to accept registry packages approved without their peer suffixes.
Files changed
building/policy/src/index.tsandbuilding/policy/test/index.tsnormalize only parsed registry identities and retain exact opaque keys.pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/build_modules.rspasses snapshot identities to policy, matches TypeScript package-separator parsing, and preserves opaque locators.pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/build_modules/tests.rscovers exact approval and denial, all three collision forms, ignored-build output, and registry peer compatibility..changeset/quiet-opaque-build-identities.mdrecords patch releases for@pnpm/building.policyandpnpm.
Commands run
$ jest building/policy/test/index.ts --runInBand
16 passed
$ cargo test -p pacquet-package-manager build_modules::tests -- --nocapture
49 passed
$ cargo fmt --all -- --check
PASS
$ git diff --check 84bb4b1a046f3a659de1c9aab1d45dcf814124ce...HEAD
PASS
Validation
- The TypeScript policy suite passed all 16 tests.
- The final pacquet build-policy suite passed all 49 tests.
- The new Rust regression reproduced the extra-
@collision before the additive fix and passed afterward. - Exact opaque approval and denial, source-only semver-tail collision rejection, registry peer normalization, and ignored-build reporting all have paired tests.
- ESLint passed on the changed TypeScript source and test files.
- Rust formatting and diff checks passed; the branch is clean and consists of three focused security commits plus additive merges of upstream through
84bb4b1a046f3a659de1c9aab1d45dcf814124ce. - The focused TypeScript suite and ESLint ran directly through the installed harness. The isolated project build cannot resolve workspace packages without a local install, and the configured registry gateway returns HTTP 403 while fetching
@pnpm/pacquet@0.11.2; no candidate-focused test failed.
Patches
10.34.2: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/14bceb1e0b2a71f4f670774db261feb03f38ec23
11.5.3: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/bf1b731ee6c0ea98709e671ff0f46bf654480ab8
Compatibility
Registry package approvals keep their existing form. Opaque dependencies that were approved through a normalized parenthesized variant must now use the exact key shown in pnpm's ignored-build output. This is the intended trust-boundary change; no package-resolution or artifact format changes.
CI note
GitHub intentionally does not run status checks on temporary private-fork pull requests. The complete policy suites, formatting, and diff checks above are the applicable validation: https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/collaborating-in-a-temporary-private-fork-to-resolve-a-security-vulnerability
Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).
Affected versions
npm
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
pnpm npm → 10.34.2
- npm
npm install pnpm@10.34.2- yarn
yarn add pnpm@10.34.2- pnpm
pnpm add pnpm@10.34.2
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-346: Origin Validation Error
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. Many file inclusion problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, especially for cookies and URL components.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6 pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml | High | Also affects pnpm |
| GHSA-2rx9-3g3h-c2jv pnpm: pacquet trust-lockfile install can create dependency symlinks outside the project | High | Also affects pnpm |
| GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install | High | Also affects pnpm |
| GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5 pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph | High | Also affects pnpm |
| GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c pnpm: Path traversal in configDependencies env lockfile allows symlink creation outside node_modules/.pnpm-config | High | Also affects pnpm |
| GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57 pnpm: `patch-remove` could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory | High | Also affects pnpm |
| GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv pnpm: Hoisted install imports lockfile alias outside node_modules | High | Also affects pnpm |
| GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h pnpm: `stage download` writes outside its destination directory via manifest name/version traversal | High | Also affects pnpm |
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