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GHSA-5vj8-3v2h-h38v

Remote Code Execution in next

High npm
Severity
High
The publisher's own rating, not a CVSS score
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
Fix
5.1.0
Upgrade next to this version or later

Description

Versions of next prior to 5.1.0 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution. The /path: route fails to properly sanitize input and passes it to a require() call. This allows attackers to execute JavaScript code on the server. Note that prior version 0.9.9 package next npm package hosted a different utility (0.4.1 being the latest version of that codebase), and this advisory does not apply to those versions.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 5.1.0.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
next
>= 0.9.9, < 5.1.0
5.1.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

next npm → 5.1.0

npm
npm install next@5.1.0
yarn
yarn add next@5.1.0
pnpm
pnpm add next@5.1.0

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
  • Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
  • Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
  • Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
  • Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
  • Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-673q-mjm6-r5xr
Next.js: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in `use cache` functions returning typed arrays
Critical Also affects next
GHSA-2464-fhr4-w9xw
Next.js: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Image Optimization API when SVG files are used
Critical Also affects next
GHSA-p3m5-59mp-jv5r
Next.js: Denial of Service in App Router using Server Actions
High Also affects next
GHSA-3w37-wq28-93x7
Next.js: Pending `use cache` fill can leak Draft Mode content into regular responses and persisted pages
Medium Also affects next
GHSA-4jqv-mc3x-m676
Next.js has cache poisoning of SSG and ISR pages in self-hosted applications
Medium Also affects next
GHSA-39w2-rjm5-chcv
Next.js has information disclosure in development server's Model Context Protocol endpoint
Medium Also affects next
GHSA-f87g-xv8r-7p7x
Next.js has information disclosure in App Router metadata image routes via dynamicParams bypass
Medium Also affects next
GHSA-mcj8-r9mp-w47p
Next.js has cache poisoning in SSG/ISR rendering that leads to cross-user content substitution and persistent denial of service
Medium Also affects next
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