GHSA-5gpj-vj23-vhhv CVE-2026-70490 PYSEC-2026-3642
Open WebUI: Unapproved accounts can open terminal sessions via a WebSocket auth path missing the role check
- Severity
- 6.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.28%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 20.86% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
0.11.0- Upgrade open-webui to this version or later
Description
Summary
The terminal WebSocket route authenticates its own first-message JWT instead of going through the HTTP dependency chain, and never applies the role check that get_verified_user enforces on every HTTP terminal route. An account whose role is pending, meaning registered but not approved, or approved and later deactivated back to pending, can therefore open an interactive terminal session that the HTTP terminal endpoints would refuse. The missing control is the verified-user role gate, not the terminal access grants, which are evaluated correctly.
Preconditions
At least one terminal server must be configured, which is off by default, and its access grants must cover the account: either public read (principal_id: "*") or a group the account still belongs to. The attacker needs a valid, unexpired JWT for a pending account and the terminal server id. Both are obtainable by an account that registered while approvals are pending, or by one that held access and was deactivated, since deactivation sets the role to pending without revoking the token, which lasts four weeks by default. Deployments with no terminal server configured, or whose terminal grants are admin-only, are not affected.
Impact
A deployment loses the account-approval boundary for terminal access. An unapproved or deactivated account gets interactive shell access, file browsing and terminal-backed tooling in the terminal environment, for as long as its token remains valid. Because the HTTP terminal routes correctly reject the same account, the two planes disagree, so an administrator who deactivates a user sees access revoked over HTTP while the WebSocket keeps working. The terminal access grants themselves are not bypassed: an account with no grant is still refused, so this only widens access to terminals already shared broadly or with a group the account remains in.
Fix
Fixed in v0.11.0 by https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/27537. Token decoding, revocation checking, user lookup and the role check are consolidated into a single get_verified_user_by_token helper, and both the terminal WebSocket route and the Socket.IO handshake now go through it. The role set lives in one constant shared with the HTTP gate so the two cannot drift apart again. Upgrading fully resolves the issue; no configuration change is required.
Root cause
Affected component: backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py, the _resolve_authenticated_connection helper backing the /{server_id}/api/terminals/{session_id} WebSocket route. Affected setup: every build from v0.8.8 onward, since the route was introduced there.
WebSocket handshakes cannot use FastAPI dependencies, so this route reimplemented authentication inline. The reimplementation reproduced the parts that are visible in the token, that it decodes and that the user row exists, and silently dropped the part that lives in the database row, the role check. Authorization then ran on two independent code paths with no shared definition of what an authenticated user is, and only one of them was updated when the role gate was introduced.
Credits
Reported by @rexpository.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui | >= 0.8.8, < 0.11.0 |
0.11.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
open-webui PyPI → 0.11.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.11.0"- poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.11.0"- uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.11.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-wvm9-9g5j-623f Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-4qg5-cxx4-g927 Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-jqhh-cjmq-vmv6 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-34r3-9m95-vq73 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-2724-6cpj-gf3v Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
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