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GHSA-56hp-xqp3-w2jf BIT-helm-2021-32690 CVE-2021-32690 GHSA-7jr6-prv4-5wf5 GO-2022-0384

Helm passes repository credentials to alternate domain

Medium Go
Severity
6.8 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.43%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 73.09% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Fix
3.6.1
Upgrade helm.sh/helm/v3 to this version or later

Description

While working on the Helm source, a Helm core maintainer discovered a situation where the username and password credentials associated with a Helm repository could be passed on to another domain referenced by that Helm repository.

Impact

The index.yaml within a Helm chart repository contains a reference where to get the chart archive for each version of a chart. The reference can be relative to the index.yaml file or a URL to location. The URL can point to any domain and this is a feature leveraged by Helm users. For example, an index.yaml file can be hosted on GitHub pages while the chart archives are hosted as GitHub releases. These are on different domain names and the index.yaml file points to the other domain.

When a username and password were associated with a Helm repository the username and password were also passed on to other domains referenced in the index.yaml file. This occurred when Helm went to retrieve a specific chart archive on the other domain.

Patches

This issue has been resolved in 3.6.1.

There is a slight behavior change to credential handling with regard to repositories. Usernames and passwords are only passed to the URL location of the Helm repository by default. The username and password are scoped to the scheme, host, and port of the Helm repository. To pass the username and password to other domains Helm may encounter when it goes to retrieve a chart, the new --pass-credentials flag can be used. This flag restores the old behavior for a single repository as an opt-in behavior.

Workarounds

If you use a username and password for a Helm repository you can audit the Helm repository in order to check for another domain being used that could have received the credentials. In the index.yaml file for that repository, look for another domain in the urls list for the chart versions. If there is another domain found and that chart version was pulled or installed the credentials would have been passed on.

For more information

Helm's security policy is spelled out in detail in our SECURITY document.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
helm.sh/helm/v3
< 3.6.1
3.6.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

helm.sh/helm/v3 Go → 3.6.1

go
go get helm.sh/helm/v3@v3.6.1 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-hr2v-4r36-88hr
Helm Chart extraction output directory collapse via `Chart.yaml` name dot-segment
Medium Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
GHSA-f9f8-9pmf-xv68
Helm May Panic Due To Incorrect YAML Content
Medium Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
GHSA-9h84-qmv7-982p
Helm Charts with Specific JSON Schema Values Can Cause Memory Exhaustion
Medium Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
GHSA-557j-xg8c-q2mm
Helm vulnerable to Code Injection through malicious chart.yaml content
High Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
GHSA-5xqw-8hwv-wg92
Helm Allows A Specially Crafted JSON Schema To Cause A Stack Overflow
Medium Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
GHSA-4hfp-h4cw-hj8p
Helm Allows A Specially Crafted Chart Archive To Cause Out Of Memory Termination
Medium Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
GHSA-r53h-jv2g-vpx6
Helm's Missing YAML Content Leads To Panic
High Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
GHSA-v53g-5gjp-272r
Helm dependency management path traversal
Medium Also affects helm.sh/helm/v3
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