Skip to content

GHSA-5286-f2rf-35c2 CVE-2023-28836 PYSEC-2023-55

Wagtail vulnerable to stored Cross-site Scripting attack via ModelAdmin views

Medium PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.78%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 55.89% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Fix
4.1.4
Upgrade wagtail to this version or later

Description

Impact

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists on ModelAdmin views within the Wagtail admin interface. A user with a limited-permission editor account for the Wagtail admin could potentially craft pages and documents that, when viewed by a user with higher privileges, could perform actions with that user's credentials. The vulnerability is not exploitable by an ordinary site visitor without access to the Wagtail admin, and only affects sites with ModelAdmin enabled.

  • For page, the vulnerability is in the "Choose a parent page" ModelAdmin view (ChooseParentView), available when managing pages via ModelAdmin.
  • For documents, the vulnerability is in the ModelAdmin Inspect view (InspectView) when displaying document fields.

Patches

Patched versions have been released as Wagtail 4.1.4 (for the LTS 4.1 branch) and Wagtail 4.2.2 (for the current 4.2 branch).

Workarounds

Site owners who are unable to upgrade to the new versions can disable or override the corresponding functionality.

ChooseParentView

For ChooseParentView:

  • Disable ModelAdmin for all page models.
  • Or provide a custom view via choose_parent_view_class, with the custom view overriding the get_form method.

One of those steps need to be applied for every ModelAdmin class hooked into Wagtail where the model is a Wagtail Page or sub-class. Here is an example of implementing the custom ChooseParentView with patched HTML escaping:

from django import forms
from django.utils.translation import gettext as _
from wagtail.contrib.modeladmin.views import ChooseParentView
from wagtail.contrib.modeladmin.forms import ParentChooserForm


class PatchedPageChoiceField(forms.ModelChoiceField):
    """PageChoiceField with plain-text breadcrumbs to patch stored XSS."""
    def label_from_instance(self, obj):
        bits = []
        for ancestor in (
            obj.get_ancestors(inclusive=True).exclude(depth=1).specific(defer=True)
        ):
            bits.append(ancestor.get_admin_display_title())
        return ' | '.join(bits)


class PatchedParentChooserForm(ParentChooserForm):
    """ParentChooserForm with custom parent_page to patch stored XSS."""
    parent_page = PatchedPageChoiceField(
        label=_("Parent page"),
        required=True,
        empty_label=None,
        queryset=Page.objects.none(),
        widget=forms.RadioSelect(),
    )


class PatchedChooseParentView(ChooseParentView):
    """ChooseParentView with custom get_form patch stored XSS."""
    def get_form(self, request):
        parents = self.permission_helper.get_valid_parent_pages(request.user)
        return PatchedParentChooserForm(parents, request.POST or None)

InspectView

For InspectView:

One of those steps need to be applied for every ModelAdmin class hooked into Wagtail where inspect_view_enabled=True. Here is an example of implementing the custom InspectView with patched HTML escaping:

from django.template.defaultfilters import filesizeformat
from django.utils.html import format_html
from wagtail.contrib.modeladmin.views import InspectView


class PatchedInspectView(InspectView):
    """InspectView with override to patch stored XSS vulnerability."""
    def get_document_field_display(self, field_name, field):
        """Render a link to a document"""
        document = getattr(self.instance, field_name)
        if document:
            return format_html(
                '<a href="{}">{} <span class="meta">({}, {})</span></a>',
                document.url,
                document.title,
                document.file_extension.upper(),
                filesizeformat(document.file.size),
            )
        return self.model_admin.get_empty_value_display(field_name)

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
wagtail
>= 1.5, < 4.1.4
4.1.4
wagtail
>= 4.2, < 4.2.2
4.2.2
wagtail
>= 1.5, < 4.1.4
>= 4.2, < 4.2.2
4.1.4
4.2.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

wagtail PyPI → 4.1.4

pip
pip install --upgrade "wagtail>=4.1.4"
poetry
poetry add "wagtail>=4.1.4"
uv
uv add "wagtail>=4.1.4"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 6.4

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
High
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: HTML body Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") URIs JavaScript sections Cascading Style Sheets and style property etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Implementation: Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
  • Implementation: With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
  • Implementation: To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most ef
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-jm5p-837g-rv8g
Wagtail: Improper restriction handling on Page translation API endpoint
Medium Also affects wagtail
GHSA-x5cx-w6p2-mxf2
Wagtail: Improper permission handling when copying snippets
Medium Also affects wagtail
GHSA-c2xx-cjmh-9q8f
Wagtail: Improper restriction handling on descendant collections in Documents and Images API
Medium Also affects wagtail
GHSA-92hv-j533-69wc
Wagtail: Identification of documents by SHA1 hash
Low Also affects wagtail
GHSA-3vrh-m9w7-v94f
Wagtail: Improper restriction handling on Pages admin API
Medium Also affects wagtail
GHSA-23m2-mghx-vqmf
Wagtail: Reflected XSS in dynamic image URL generator view
High Also affects wagtail
GHSA-8634-mr4j-r72c
Wagtail: Pages translations can be created without page permissions when using simple_translation
Medium Also affects wagtail
GHSA-r6p4-grq7-xm4m
Wagtail: Improper permission handling in image preview
Medium Also affects wagtail
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor