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GHSA-4m8c-h7fr-gq5c CVE-2016-6637

Cloud Foundry vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery

Critical Maven
Severity
9.6 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.73%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 54.15% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Fix
2.7.4.7
Upgrade org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server to this version or later

Description

Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in Pivotal Cloud Foundry (PCF) before 242; UAA 2.x before 2.7.4.7, 3.x before 3.3.0.5, and 3.4.x before 3.4.4; UAA BOSH before 11.5 and 12.x before 12.5; Elastic Runtime before 1.6.40, 1.7.x before 1.7.21, and 1.8.x before 1.8.2; and Ops Manager 1.7.x before 1.7.13 and 1.8.x before 1.8.1 allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of unspecified victims for requests that approve or deny a scope via a profile or authorize approval page.

Affected versions

Maven

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server Maven → 2.7.4.7

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.cloudfoundry.identity</groupId><artifactId>cloudfoundry-identity-server</artifactId><version>2.7.4.7</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server:2.7.4.7")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 9.6

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
  • Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
  • Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
  • Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-6wcw-r64p-qrrw
Cloudfoundry UAA has logic error in the token revocation endpoint implementation
Medium Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
GHSA-xg5v-696h-c3vr
Cloud Foundry UAA SessionID present in Audit Event Logs
High Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
GHSA-xh4m-99qp-w483
Cloud Foundry UAA open redirect
Medium Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
GHSA-rc2r-w8jv-vggp
Cloud Foundry vulnerable to Improper Certificate Validation
Medium Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
GHSA-r4v8-9hgx-vm6m
Cloud Foundry UAA accepts refresh token as access token on admin endpoints
High Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
GHSA-292x-hjr8-226f
Cloud Foundry UAA Privilege Escalation
High Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
GHSA-j97q-9xp9-g5fx
Pivotal Cloud Foundry UAA XSS on UAA OpenID Connect check session iframe endpoint
Medium Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
GHSA-j4p3-2m2h-cv5f
Cloud Foundry UAA Denial of Service through client token revocation endpoint
Medium Also affects org.cloudfoundry.identity:cloudfoundry-identity-server
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