GHSA-48hr-524c-v5w3 CVE-2026-71318
Nuxt: Unauthorized Component Instantiation via Server Island Props
- Severity
- 4.8 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.32%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 24.47% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
- Fix
4.5.1- Upgrade nuxt to this version or later
Description
Impact
Nuxt server islands accept props via the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint. When an application has a server island component that forwards props directly into Vue's dynamic component resolution (<component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, or h()), an attacker can pass a plain string value (rather than a component definition) to instantiate any globally-registered Vue component or any native HTML element.
For example:
{ "as": "SomeGlobalComponent" }
...resolves and renders SomeGlobalComponent if it is globally registered, even though the attacker should only be able to drive props for the island's declared component. Similarly, { "as": "iframe" } renders an <iframe> element.
Unlike the primary RCE vector (GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq), this does not require vue.runtimeCompiler to be enabled. A plain string prop is sufficient to trigger component resolution. The template/render key guard that addresses the RCE vector does not block plain string values.
Some component libraries expose a polymorphic as / asChild prop that forwards its value into <component :is>; @nuxt/ui (via reka-ui) is a widely used example. An application is affected if such a component receives the attacker-controlled value inside a server island. Note this does not require explicit prop forwarding: island props the island component does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root element, so an island whose root is a reka-ui / @nuxt/ui component receives the attacker's as value implicitly. Unlike the RCE vector, no vue.runtimeCompiler is required, which makes this vector reachable in more configurations. These libraries are not themselves vulnerable; they are noted only because they commonly provide the dynamic-component sink. Installing @nuxt/ui does not by itself register any component as a server island: the application must define the island (a .server.vue file).
Mitigating factors
- Exploitation requires a server island component that puts an attacker-controlled value onto a dynamic-component path (
<component :is>,resolveDynamicComponent,h(), or a polymorphicas/asChildprop), either explicitly or via attribute fallthrough when the island's root is such a component. - Reachable components are limited to what is actually in the island app's global registry. In a default pages-enabled app that is
RouterViewandRouterLink(both registered globally by the pages router plugin, which runs even in component islands), plus anycomponents/global/component and any component a module registers globally.RouterLinkin particular renders an attacker-influenced<a>(and, because an island that declares no props forwards all props,toand otherRouterLinkprops ride the same fallthrough). Vue built-ins (Transition,KeepAlive,Teleport,Suspense) and Nuxt auto-imports (ClientOnly,NuxtLink,NuxtPage, etc.) are NOT in the island app's global registry and cannot be resolved this way; an unresolved name instead renders as a native HTML element (the element-injection half of this issue). - Declaring the props an island accepts, or setting
inheritAttrs: falseon it, prevents an undeclaredasfrom falling through to a polymorphic root and neutralizes this vector. - Arbitrary JavaScript execution is not possible through this vector (no
template/rendercompilation). - Island component names are constrained to the build-time component registry; an attacker cannot resolve arbitrary components.
Affected versions
Nuxt >=3.1.0 <3.21.10 and >=4.0.0 <4.5.1, with component islands active. The island prop-forwarding behavior has existed since server islands were introduced in v3.1.0, and this vector does not depend on vue.runtimeCompiler. Nuxt 2 is not affected.
Note the patch (below) closes the implicit attribute-fallthrough path, which is the majority case. An island that explicitly forwards an untrusted prop into dynamic component resolution (or forwards it under a prop name other than as) remains the application's responsibility in every version; see Workarounds.
Patches
Fixed in nuxt@4.5.1 and nuxt@3.21.10. Patched releases reject a top-level as island prop (HTTP 400 at the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint). This closes the implicit path: island props an island does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root, so a top-level as would otherwise reach a polymorphic root component's as prop (the reka-ui / @nuxt/ui convention) and drive dynamic component resolution without the author binding it. Rejecting the top-level as prop blocks that fallthrough while leaving nested data and other prop names untouched.
The framework deliberately does not attempt to block every case: it cannot safely tell a string used as data from one used as a component selector, and it has no island-local hook into Vue's h() or resolveDynamicComponent(). An island that explicitly forwards an untrusted value into <component :is> / h() / resolveDynamicComponent(), or that forwards it under a different polymorphic prop name, is therefore not covered by the patch and must follow the guidance below. The Nuxt documentation now warns against this.
Workarounds
Upgrade to nuxt@4.5.1 or nuxt@3.21.10. That upgrade also removes the related object-prop RCE (GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq). In addition, in any version:
- Do not forward island props into
<component :is>,resolveDynamicComponent, orh(). Map an untrusted discriminator through a closed allowlist of imported component definitions instead of passing the raw prop value. - Declare the props an island accepts, or set
inheritAttrs: falseon it, so request input cannot fall through to a polymorphic root component. - Avoid registering sensitive components globally that could leak information if instantiated by an attacker.
Affected versions
npm
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
nuxt npm → 4.5.1
- npm
npm install nuxt@4.5.1- yarn
yarn add nuxt@4.5.1- pnpm
pnpm add nuxt@4.5.1
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 4.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
- Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-9v7c-q64q-vv33 Nuxt: Dot segments in the request path bypass `server/middleware` path checks and server route rules on page routes | Medium | Also affects nuxt |
| GHSA-xfq5-w38q-pc2x Nuxt server islands render `useHeadSafe` input without sanitisation | Medium | Also affects nuxt |
| GHSA-vjh5-4x84-xrqp Nuxt: Server-side route rules (`redirect`, `headers`, `proxy`, `ssr`) are skipped for case-variant paths when routing is case-insensitive | Medium | Also affects nuxt |
| GHSA-6gq8-jgmh-3ffp Nuxt: Route rules are matched against the raw request path, so a percent-encoded segment can bypass `appMiddleware` on dynamic and catch-all routes | Medium | Also affects nuxt |
| GHSA-jjm6-p2m9-9w4x Nuxt: Incomplete fix for GHSA-934w-87qh-qr26: a `javascript:` URL prefixed with an ASCII control character executes from `<NuxtLink>` when `pages` is disabled | Low | Also affects nuxt |
| GHSA-7c4v-fwgw-9rf7 Nuxt dev server discloses project root and workspace UUID via the Chrome DevTools workspace endpoint | Medium | Also affects nuxt |
| GHSA-9pgf-384g-p7mv Nuxt: Unauthenticated CPU exhaustion parsing and hashing the Nuxt island endpoint body before hash validation | High | Also affects nuxt |
| GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq Nuxt: Server-Side Remote Code Execution via Runtime Template Injection in Nuxt Server Island Props | High | Also affects nuxt |
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