GHSA-3x94-fv5h-5q2c BIT-typo3-2020-15099 CVE-2020-15099
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in TYPO3 CMS
High
Packagist
- Severity
- 8.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 1.79%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 78.36% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Meta
- CVSS:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C(7.5)- CWE-20, CWE-200
Problem
In case an attacker manages to generate a valid cryptographic message authentication code (HMAC-SHA1) - either by using a different existing vulnerability or in case the internal encryptionKey was exposed - it is possible to retrieve arbitrary files of a TYPO3 installation. This includes the possibility to fetch typo3conf/LocalConfiguration.php which again contains the encryptionKey as well as credentials of the database management system being used.
In case a database server is directly accessible either via internet or in a shared hosting network, this allows to completely retrieve, manipulate or delete database contents. This includes creating an administration user account - which can be used to trigger remote code execution by injecting custom extensions.
Solution
Update to TYPO3 versions 9.5.20 or 10.4.6 that fix the problem described.
Credits
Thanks to TYPO3 security team member Oliver Hader who reported and fixed the issue.
References
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| typo3/cms | >= 10.0.0, < 10.4.6 |
10.4.6 |
| typo3/cms | >= 9.0.0, < 9.5.20 |
9.5.20 |
| typo3/cms-core | >= 9.0.0, < 9.5.20 |
9.5.20 |
| typo3/cms-core | >= 10.0.0, < 10.4.6 |
10.4.6 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
typo3/cms Packagist → 10.4.6
- composer
composer require typo3/cms:^10.4.6
typo3/cms-core Packagist → 9.5.20
- composer
composer require typo3/cms-core:^9.5.20
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 8.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
- Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-68jx-f42c-7599 TYPO3 CMS - Broken Access Control in Backend and Install Tool | High | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
| GHSA-chm7-4vch-h8vr TYPO3 CMS has Broken Access Control in its Media Module | High | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
| GHSA-jh32-v29g-68pq TYPO3 CMS has Privilege Escalation & SQL Injection in its Form Framework | High | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
| GHSA-c78m-c52x-jgwp TYPO3 CMS has Insecure Deserialization via Core API | Medium | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
| GHSA-jf56-v8jc-jcc5 TYPO3 CMS has Broken Access Control in its File Abstraction Layer | Low | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
| GHSA-2j54-93q2-3hjq TYPO3 CMS has Broken Access Control in Backend API | Medium | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
| GHSA-q93m-25xv-94hh TYPO3 CMS: Broken Access Control in Media Module | Medium | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
| GHSA-qcmw-6rm2-5x78 TYPO3 CMS has Broken Access Control in its DataHandler | Medium | Also affects typo3/cms-core |
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