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GHSA-3wp3-xxj9-5jqq CVE-2026-59213 PYSEC-2026-3589

Open WebUI: Cross-user model-list exposure via static cache key in get_all_models (aiocache key= vs key_builder= misuse)

Medium PyPI
Severity
3.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.37%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 31.24% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-524 Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information
Fix
0.10.0
Upgrade open-webui to this version or later

Description

Summary

The get_all_models handlers in routers/openai.py and routers/ollama.py intended to cache their permission-filtered model lists per user, but the @cached decorator was misconfigured: it passed a key= lambda instead of key_builder=. In aiocache 0.12.3 (the pinned version), key= is a static cache key — a callable passed there is used as a constant object, not invoked per call. As a result the per-user key was never computed, and all callers collided onto a single shared cache entry within the TTL window. During that window, one user's permission-filtered model list could be served to a different authenticated user, crossing the per-user authorization boundary.

Impact

  • Boundary crossed: Confidentiality (cross-user). A caller can receive the model list scoped to a different security principal than themselves.
  • A user (or admin, or — depending on endpoint reachability — anonymous caller) who populates the cache causes the next caller within the TTL to receive that list rather than their own permission-filtered one.
  • What's disclosed is the set of models another principal can access, including potentially the existence and naming of models restricted from the receiving user.
  • Exposure is incidental and timing-dependent, not attacker-controlled: the leaked entry is whatever the most recent caller populated within MODELS_CACHE_TTL (default 1 second), and the attacker cannot select the victim or force a target's list into the cache.

Affected component

  • backend/open_webui/routers/openai.py — get_all_models (~line 488)
  • backend/open_webui/routers/ollama.py — get_all_models (~line 302)

Both decorated with @cached(ttl=MODELS_CACHE_TTL, key=lambda ...). No other @cached(... key=lambda ...) misuse was found elsewhere in the backend.

Root cause

aiocache 0.12's @cached treats key= as a static key; the per-call hook is key_builder= with signature key_builder(func, *args, **kwargs). Passing a callable to key= uses the callable object itself as a constant key, so every invocation resolved to the same entry and the intended per-user.id namespacing never occurred.

Reproduction (default config)

  1. On a default deployment, configure at least two users with different model-access permissions (e.g. one model restricted to user A).
  2. As user A, request the model list (populates the shared cache entry).
  3. Within MODELS_CACHE_TTL (default 1s), as user B, request the model list.
  4. User B receives user A's permission-filtered list, including models B is not permitted to see.

Remediation

Replace key= with key_builder= at both call sites and adjust the lambda to take the function as its first argument:

@cached(
    ttl=MODELS_CACHE_TTL,
    key_builder=lambda _func, request, user=None: (
        f'openai_all_models_{user.id}' if user else 'openai_all_models'
    ),
)

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
open-webui
>= 0.6.27, < 0.10.0
0.10.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

open-webui PyPI → 0.10.0

pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.10.0"
poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.10.0"
uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.10.0"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 3.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-524: Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information

The code uses a cache that contains sensitive information, but the cache can be read by an actor outside of the intended control sphere.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Protect information stored in cache.
  • Architecture and Design: Do not store unnecessarily sensitive information in the cache.
  • Architecture and Design: Consider using encryption in the cache.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
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GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28
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Medium Also affects open-webui
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