Skip to content

GHSA-3m6q-jj5j-38c9 CVE-2026-54592

Oj: Stack Buffer Overflow in Oj::Doc#each_child via Deeply Nested Input

High RubyGems
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.33%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.88% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write
Fix
3.17.3
Upgrade oj to this version or later

Description

Summary

Oj::Doc#each_child, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON.

Details

Two-step chain in ext/oj/fast.c:

  1. doc_each_child (~line 1501) increments doc->where past the where_path[MAX_STACK = 100] array with no bounds check, and never restores it (doc->where-- is missing). Calling each_child recursively from inside the yield block therefore drives doc->where beyond the array.

  2. On the next entry (~line 1478) the function copies the path into a stack-local buffer:

    Leaf  save_path[MAX_STACK];           // 800-byte stack buffer
    size_t wlen = doc->where - doc->where_path;
    if (0 < wlen) {
        memcpy(save_path, doc->where_path, sizeof(Leaf) * (wlen + 1));
    }
    

    When the previous recursive call left doc->where past where_path[100], wlen exceeds MAX_STACK and the memcpy overflows save_path on the C stack.

The Oj::Doc parser imposes no JSON nesting-depth limit (it relies on a C-stack pressure check), so deeply nested attacker input reaches this path.

Proof of Concept

require 'oj'
depth = 200
payload = '[' * depth + '1' + ']' * depth
Oj::Doc.open(payload) do |doc|
  r = lambda { doc.each_child { |_| r.call } }
  r.call
end

Recursion depth <= 99 iterates normally; depth >= 101 aborts. lldb backtrace on the affected build (ruby 3.3.8 / arm64-darwin24):

SIGABRT
#2 __abort
#3 __stack_chk_fail
#4 doc_each_child   (oj.bundle, fast.c)

Impact

Reliable denial of service: any endpoint that calls Oj::Doc.open(untrusted) { |d| d.each_child ... } recursively can be crashed with a small deeply-nested payload. On builds with a stack protector (the default, -fstack-protector-strong) the canary aborts the process before the saved return address is used. The Step-1 heap OOB writes into struct _doc fields do occur, but are masked in practice because the Step-2 stack overflow crashes first; turning them into anything beyond a crash has not been demonstrated.

Patches

Fixed in 3.17.3: doc_each_child now bounds-checks before incrementing doc->where (raising Oj::DepthError) and restores doc->where after the loop, matching the existing each_leaf pattern. Verified on the fixed build: depth >= 101 raises a clean Oj::DepthError instead of aborting.

Credit

Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).

Affected versions

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
oj
< 3.17.3
3.17.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

oj RubyGems → 3.17.3

bundler
bundle update oj # Gemfile: gem "oj", ">= 3.17.3"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read

The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a language that provides appropriate memory abstractions.

CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
  • Implementation: Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory: Double check that the buffer is as large as specified. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
  • Operation: Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment. For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
  • Implementation: Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-475m-ph3x-64gp
Oj: Integer Overflow in Oj.load 2GB String Handling
High Also affects oj
GHSA-m578-w5vf-rfcm
Oj: Use-After-Free in Oj::Parser SAJ Long Key Callback
High Also affects oj
GHSA-vwm4-62gf-x745
Oj: Use-After-Free in Oj::Parser array_class/hash_class GC Marking
High Also affects oj
GHSA-9cv6-qcjw-4grx
Oj: Negative-Size memcpy in Oj::Parser create_id Attribute Handling
High Also affects oj
GHSA-q2gm-54r6-8fwm
Oj: Use-After-Free in Oj::Parser SAJ Callback via Input Mutation
High Also affects oj
GHSA-9ppp-w3g4-fh4q
Oj: Use-After-Free in Oj::Doc Iterators via Reentrant Close
High Also affects oj
GHSA-35w3-pjm6-wj95
Oj: Heap Buffer Overflow in Oj.dump Exception Serialization via Large Indent
High Also affects oj
GHSA-fm7p-mprw-wjm9
Oj: intern.c form_attr (uninitialized stack read)
Medium Also affects oj
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor