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GHSA-39p5-2wrr-xh29 CVE-2026-91980 GO-2026-6713

Vikunja: Any user can enumerate every team and its members by attaching arbitrary teams to a throwaway project

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.31%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 23.45% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Fix
2.6.0
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to this version or later

Description

Summary

When you share a project with a team, the API lets you attach any team on the instance, including teams you have nothing to do with, as long as you're an admin of the project. Listing a project's teams then returns each team's full member roster. So any logged-in user can spin up a throwaway project, attach team IDs one by one, and read back the name, description, and complete member list of every team on the instance. Normally you can only see teams you belong to; this path ignores that.

Details

Sharing a project with a team is a two-step flow: you PUT a team to the project, then you GET the project's teams to see them. The share endpoint only enforces that you're an admin of the target project, it doesn't care whether the team you're referencing is one you're allowed to see. Any existing team ID is accepted.

The listing endpoint is even more permissive: read access to the project is enough, which you obviously have on a project you created. And its response isn't just a list of team names, it includes each team's description, creator, and a full members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag.

Put together, an attacker who owns a single project can walk the team ID space and pull the roster of every team in the instance, including teams they aren't a member of. This contradicts how team visibility works everywhere else in the product, where you only ever see teams you belong to. Emails are stripped from the roster, so what leaks is identities and org structure rather than contact details.

The fix is to require that the caller actually has access to the team they're attaching, not just to the project.

PoC

The attacker needs nothing but an ordinary account.

  1. Create a throwaway project you own:
  2. Attach team IDs one by one (sweep the range you want):
PUT /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams
{<SNIP>, "team_id": <N>, <SNIP>}
  1. Read them back with their rosters:
GET /api/v1/projects/<your_project_id>/teams

Each entry contains the team name, description, creator, and a members array with every member's username, display name, and admin flag, for teams you are not a member of.

Impact

Information disclosure of the instance-wide team directory: team names, descriptions, and full membership, for teams the attacker has no relationship with. This maps out the organisation's group structure and who belongs where, useful for targeting and social engineering. Any authenticated account is enough; no share link, no admin rights, no victim interaction.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.vikunja.io/api
< 2.6.0
2.6.0
code.vikunja.io/api
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.vikunja.io/api Go → 2.6.0

go
go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.6.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
  • Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp
Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fmmf-xq98-g327
Vikunja: Write-level project members can delete admin-tier link shares through an unloaded permission check
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-pjr3-86v4-5p7w
Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-hjx8-qv73-f7cm
Vikunja: Webhooks and link shares survive every revocation path, so a removed collaborator keeps a live feed
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fprf-r6rv-xg99
Vikunja: Saved filter creation with an empty filter string recalculates task positions across all tenants
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g
Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-w2ch-4xgr-22ww
Vikunja: Task relation deletion does not check read access to the other task, allowing cross-project relation removal
Low Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737
Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpoint
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
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