GHSA-37q5-v5qm-c9v8 CVE-2024-3568 PYSEC-2026-1978
Transformers Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability
- Severity
- 3.4 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 2.08%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 81.56% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- Fix
4.38.0- Upgrade transformers to this version or later
Description
The huggingface/transformers library is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution through deserialization of untrusted data within the load_repo_checkpoint() function of the TFPreTrainedModel() class. Attackers can execute arbitrary code and commands by crafting a malicious serialized payload, exploiting the use of pickle.load() on data from potentially untrusted sources. This vulnerability allows for remote code execution (RCE) by deceiving victims into loading a seemingly harmless checkpoint during a normal training process, thereby enabling attackers to execute arbitrary code on the targeted machine.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| transformers | < 4.38.0 |
4.38.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
transformers PyPI → 4.38.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "transformers>=4.38.0"- poetry
poetry add "transformers>=4.38.0"- uv
uv add "transformers>=4.38.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.0 3.4
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-x9r9-c232-4q39 Hugging Face Transformers downloads custom generation code before trust consent | High | Also affects transformers |
| GHSA-xrqw-3rrv-vx5w Transformers save_pretrained path traversal allows arbitrary file writes through chat template names | High | Also affects transformers |
| GHSA-fgcw-684q-jj6r huggingface/transformers: Arbitrary Code Execution During Model Initialization in the LightGlue Model Loading Path | Critical | Also affects transformers |
| GHSA-29pf-2h5f-8g72 HuggingFace transformers vulnerable to remote code execution | High | Also affects transformers |
| GHSA-69w3-r845-3855 HuggingFace Transformers allows for arbitrary code execution in the `Trainer` class | High | Also affects transformers |
| PYSEC-2025-218 Hugging Face Transformers GLM4 Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. | High | Also affects transformers |
| PYSEC-2025-217 Hugging Face Transformers X-CLIP Checkpoint Conversion Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. | High | Also affects transformers |
| PYSEC-2025-216 Hugging Face Transformers HuBERT convert_config Code Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. | High | Also affects transformers |
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