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GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj CVE-2025-69264

pnpm v10+ Bypass "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default"

Critical npm
Severity
8.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.01%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 63.23% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure
Fix
10.26.0
Upgrade pnpm to this version or later

Description

pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass

Summary

A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during pnpm install, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks postinstall scripts via the onlyBuiltDependencies mechanism, git dependencies can still execute prepare, prepublish, and prepack scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval.

Details

pnpm v10 introduced a security feature to disable dependency lifecycle scripts by default (PR #8897). This is implemented by setting onlyBuiltDependencies = [] when no build policy is configured:

File: pkg-manager/core/src/install/extendInstallOptions.ts (lines 290-291)

if (opts.neverBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependenciesFile == null) {
  opts.onlyBuiltDependencies = []
}

This creates an allowlist that blocks all packages from running scripts during the BUILD phase in exec/build-modules/src/index.ts.

However, git-hosted dependencies are processed differently. During the FETCH phase, git packages are prepared using preparePackage():

File: exec/prepare-package/src/index.ts (lines 28-57)

export async function preparePackage (opts: PreparePackageOptions, gitRootDir: string, subDir: string) {
  // ...
  if (opts.ignoreScripts) return { shouldBeBuilt: true, pkgDir }  // Only checks ignoreScripts, not onlyBuiltDependencies

  const execOpts: RunLifecycleHookOptions = {
    // ...
    rawConfig: omit(['ignore-scripts'], opts.rawConfig),  // Explicitly removes ignore-scripts!
  }

  // Runs npm/pnpm install
  await runLifecycleHook(installScriptName, manifest, execOpts)

  // Runs prepare scripts
  for (const scriptName of PREPUBLISH_SCRIPTS) {  // ['prepublish', 'prepack', 'publish']
    await runLifecycleHook(newScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
  }
}

The ignoreScripts option defaults to false and is completely separate from onlyBuiltDependencies. The onlyBuiltDependencies allowlist is never consulted during the fetch phase.

Affected scripts that execute during fetch:

  • prepare
  • prepublish
  • prepack

Attack vectors:

  • git+https://github.com/attacker/malicious.git
  • github:attacker/malicious
  • gitlab:attacker/malicious
  • bitbucket:attacker/malicious
  • git+ssh://git@github.com/attacker/malicious.git
  • git+file:///path/to/local/repo
PoC

Prerequisites:

  • pnpm v10.0.0 or later (tested on v10.23.0 and v11.0.0-alpha.1)
  • git

Steps to reproduce:

  1. Extract the attached poc.zip

  2. Run the PoC script:

    cd poc
    chmod +x run-poc.sh
    ./run-poc.sh
    
  3. Verify the marker file was created by the malicious script:

    cat /tmp/pnpm-vuln-poc-marker.txt
    

Manual reproduction:

  1. Create a malicious package with a prepare script:

    {
      "name": "malicious-pkg",
      "version": "1.0.0",
      "scripts": {
        "prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt', 'RCE!')\""
      }
    }
    
  2. Initialize it as a git repo and commit the files

  3. Create a victim project that depends on it (just have to make sure it actually git clones and not just downloads a tarball):

    {
      "dependencies": {
        "malicious-pkg": "git+file:///path/to/malicious-pkg"
      }
    }
    
  4. Run pnpm install - the prepare script executes without any warning or approval prompt

Impact

Severity: High

Who is impacted:

  • All pnpm v10+ users
  • Users who believed they were protected by the v10 "scripts disabled by default" feature
  • CI/CD pipelines

Attack scenarios:

  1. Supply chain attack: An attacker compromises a dependency, adding to it a malicious git dependency that executes arbitrary code during pnpm install

What an attacker can do:

  • Execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges
  • Exfiltrate environment variables, secrets, and credentials
  • Modify source code or inject backdoors
  • Establish persistence or reverse shells
  • Access the filesystem and network

Why this bypasses security expectations:

  • pnpm v10 changelog explicitly states "Lifecycle scripts of dependencies are not executed during installation by default"
  • Users expect git dependencies to follow the same security model as npm registry packages
  • There is no warning that git dependencies are treated differently
  • The onlyBuiltDependencies configuration does not affect git dependencies

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pnpm
>= 10.0.0, < 10.26.0
10.26.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

pnpm npm → 10.26.0

npm
npm install pnpm@10.26.0
yarn
yarn add pnpm@10.26.0
pnpm
pnpm add pnpm@10.26.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6
pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-2rx9-3g3h-c2jv
pnpm: pacquet trust-lockfile install can create dependency symlinks outside the project
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m
pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5
pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c
pnpm: Path traversal in configDependencies env lockfile allows symlink creation outside node_modules/.pnpm-config
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57
pnpm: `patch-remove` could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv
pnpm: Hoisted install imports lockfile alias outside node_modules
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h
pnpm: `stage download` writes outside its destination directory via manifest name/version traversal
High Also affects pnpm
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