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GHSA-3298-56p6-rpw2 CVE-2026-35667

OpenClaw has incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27486: Unvalidated SIGKILL in `!stop` Chat Command via `shell-utils.ts`

Medium npm
Severity
6.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.15%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 3.79% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-404 Improper Resource Shutdown or Release
Fix
2026.3.24
Upgrade openclaw to this version or later

Description

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Advisory Details

Title: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27486: Unvalidated SIGKILL in !stop Chat Command via shell-utils.ts

Description:

Summary

The !stop (and /bash stop) chat command kills background bash processes using SIGKILL directly, without first sending SIGTERM to allow graceful shutdown. This is because bash-command.ts imports killProcessTree() from src/agents/shell-utils.ts, which still contains the pre-CVE-2026-27486 aggressive kill logic, rather than from the patched src/process/kill-tree.ts.

Details

CVE-2026-27486 fixed unsafe process termination by introducing a graceful shutdown sequence in src/process/kill-tree.ts — sending SIGTERM first, waiting a configurable grace period (default 3 seconds), then escalating to SIGKILL only if the process is still alive.

However, an identical copy of the unpatched killProcessTree function remains in src/agents/shell-utils.ts (lines 170–192). This function sends SIGKILL immediately with no SIGTERM:

// src/agents/shell-utils.ts:170-192
export function killProcessTree(pid: number): void {
  // ... Windows handling ...
  try {
    process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); // Immediate hard kill, no SIGTERM
  } catch {
    try {
      process.kill(pid, "SIGKILL");
    } catch {
      // process already dead
    }
  }
}

The !stop chat command handler in src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts imports and calls this vulnerable version at line 302:

// src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:5
import { killProcessTree } from "../../agents/shell-utils.js";

// src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:300-304
const pid = running.pid ?? running.child?.pid;
if (pid) {
  killProcessTree(pid);  // Calls the UNPATCHED version
}
markExited(running, null, "SIGKILL", "failed");

Compare this to the patched version in src/process/kill-tree.ts:

// src/process/kill-tree.ts:46-78
function killProcessTreeUnix(pid: number, graceMs: number): void {
  // Step 1: Try graceful SIGTERM to process group
  try {
    process.kill(-pid, "SIGTERM");
  } catch { /* ... */ }

  // Step 2: Wait grace period, then SIGKILL if still alive
  setTimeout(() => {
    if (isProcessAlive(-pid)) {
      try { process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); } catch { /* ... */ }
    }
  }, graceMs).unref();
}

PoC

This PoC demonstrates the difference between the vulnerable and patched code paths inside a running OpenClaw Gateway container.

Setup:

# Build and start the gateway container
cd CVE-2026-27486-variant-exp/
docker compose up -d
sleep 5

Exploit (vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts):

The following script is injected into the container and executed. It starts a bash process that traps SIGTERM for graceful shutdown, then kills it using the same code path as !stop:

// exploit_sigkill.cjs — replicates src/agents/shell-utils.ts:183-190
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const fs = require('fs');

try { fs.unlinkSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt'); } catch {}

const child = spawn('/bin/bash', ['-c',
  'trap \'echo GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN > /tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt; exit 0\' SIGTERM; while true; do sleep 1; done'
], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' });
child.unref();

setTimeout(() => {
  // VULNERABLE: same as shell-utils.ts — SIGKILL only
  try { process.kill(-child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch {
    try { process.kill(child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch {}
  }
  setTimeout(() => {
    if (fs.existsSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt')) {
      console.log('[BLOCKED] SIGTERM was received.');
      process.exit(1);
    } else {
      console.log('[EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered.');
      process.exit(0);
    }
  }, 2000);
}, 1000);

Run:

python3 poc_exploit.py

Log of Evidence

Exploit output (SIGKILL only, no graceful shutdown):

[*] Running exploit (vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts)...
[*] Victim PID: 78
[*] Calling vulnerable killProcessTree (SIGKILL only, no SIGTERM)...
[EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered.
[EXPLOITED] Graceful shutdown handler was NEVER invoked.

[SUCCESS] CVE-2026-27486 variant confirmed:
  killProcessTree() in shell-utils.ts sends immediate SIGKILL,
  bypassing the graceful shutdown fix in process/kill-tree.ts.

Control output (SIGTERM first, graceful shutdown works):

[*] Running control (patched killProcessTree from process/kill-tree.ts)...
[*] Victim PID: 93
[*] Calling patched killProcessTree (SIGTERM first, then SIGKILL after grace)...
[NORMAL] SIGTERM received — graceful shutdown completed. Flag: GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN

[NORMAL] Control confirmed: patched killProcessTree sends SIGTERM first,
         allowing graceful shutdown before escalating to SIGKILL.

Impact

When !stop is used, background processes are killed instantly via SIGKILL with no chance to perform cleanup. This can result in:

  • Data corruption: processes writing to files or databases are interrupted mid-write
  • Resource leaks: temporary files, lock files, and network connections are not properly released
  • Security-sensitive cleanup skipped: operations like erasing in-memory secrets or completing audit logs are bypassed

This is the same class of impact that CVE-2026-27486 was filed for — the fix simply missed the shell-utils.ts copy of the function.

Affected products

  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Package name: openclaw
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.14
  • Patched versions: <None>

Severity

  • Severity: Medium
  • Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

Weaknesses

  • CWE: CWE-404: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release

Occurrences

Permalink Description
https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/agents/shell-utils.ts#L170-L192 The vulnerable killProcessTree function that sends immediate SIGKILL without SIGTERM.
https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L5 Import statement pulling the vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts instead of the patched kill-tree.ts.
https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L300-L304 The !stop handler calling the vulnerable killProcessTree(pid).
https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/process/kill-tree.ts#L46-L78 The patched killProcessTreeUnix with graceful SIGTERM → grace period → SIGKILL sequence (for reference).

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
openclaw
< 2026.3.24
2026.3.24

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openclaw npm → 2026.3.24

npm
npm install openclaw@2026.3.24
yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.3.24
pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.3.24

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 6.9

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 6.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-404: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release

The product does not release or incorrectly releases a resource before it is made available for re-use.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, languages such as Java, Ruby, and Lisp perform automatic garbage collection that releases memory for objects that have been deallocated.
  • Implementation: It is good practice to be responsible for freeing all resources you allocate and to be consistent with how and where you free memory in a function. If you allocate memory that you intend to free upon completion of the function, you must be sure to free the memory at all exit points for that function including error conditions.
  • Implementation: Memory should be allocated/freed using matching functions such as malloc/free, new/delete, and new[]/delete[].
  • Implementation: When releasing a complex object or structure, ensure that you properly dispose of all of its member components, not just the object itself.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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