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GHSA-2r8f-cf6w-x5vq

Duplicate Advisory: FUXA contains a hard-coded credential vulnerability

High Withdrawn May 11, 2026 npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-c8m8-3jcr-6rj5. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

FUXA v1.2.7 contains a hard-coded credential vulnerability in server/api/jwt-helper.js. The application uses a hard-coded secret key to sign and verify JWT Tokens. This allows remote attackers to forge valid admin tokens and bypass authentication to gain full administrative access.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
fuxa-server
<= 1.2.7
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Unreported

Weakness

CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
  • Architecture and Design: If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
  • Architecture and Design: For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Withdrawn
  3. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-8ghr-w65f-j3qr
FUXA's scheduler API missing admin check enables operator-to-admin escalation via scheduled device actions
Medium Also affects fuxa-server
GHSA-h9fj-c2qr-76g2
FUXA has SQL Injection in its TDengine DAQ connector via backslash bypass of escapeTdString
Medium Also affects fuxa-server
GHSA-w86f-rf9w-h3x6
FUXA: Unauthenticated SSRF via Socket.IO DEVICE_WEBAPI_REQUEST and DEVICE_PROPERTY with response reading
High Also affects fuxa-server
GHSA-r9g5-7q8j-958c
FUXA provides guest and invalid-token access to protected read APIs in secure mode
Medium Also affects fuxa-server
GHSA-q3w6-q3hc-c5x6
FUXA's Unauthenticated Project Data Disclosure Exposes Server-Side Scripts and Device Configurations
High Also affects fuxa-server
GHSA-rg3m-cfq7-g6h6
FUXA Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Script Test Mode Authorization Bypass
High Also affects fuxa-server
GHSA-fwcm-rqvw-j3p7
FUXA has an unauthenticated arbitrary tag value disclosure via /api/getTagValue
High Also affects fuxa-server
GHSA-68m5-5w2h-h837
FUXA Affected by a Path Traversal Sanitization Bypass
High Also affects fuxa-server
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