GHSA-2phq-3phc-84px CVE-2026-105755 PYSEC-2026-4198
vLLM: Flash late-interaction scoring caches query embeddings under a caller-controlled request id — cross-request integrity break and induced errors on `/score` and `/rerank`
- Severity
- 4.2 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.20%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 10.21% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
- Fix
0.30.0- Upgrade vllm to this version or later
Description
Affected
- Ecosystem / package: pip /
vllm - Affected versions: vLLM ≤ 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit
752a3a504485). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the flash late-interaction query cache reaches.
Summary
On late-interaction /score and /rerank deployments with flash late interaction enabled (the default for supported models), the worker caches per-request query embeddings under a key derived from the caller-controlled X-Request-Id header. A second concurrent request that reuses the victim's header value replaces the victim's cached query embedding before document scoring — so the victim's documents are scored against the attacker's query. Because the data-parallel router pins all requests sharing a cache key to the same engine, the collision is deterministic for an attacker who reuses the victim's X-Request-Id. Depending on timing, one request can also consume the shared use counter and force the other request into a late-interaction cache-miss error.
This is a remotely reachable, request-controlled cross-request integrity break on the standard scoring and reranking endpoints. It requires only that flash late interaction be enabled, which is the default for supported models.
Affected code
Links pinned to the confirmed commit 752a3a504485 (v0.25.1):
vllm/entrypoints/serve/engine/serving.py#L117-L124—_base_request_id()copies the publicX-Request-Idheader directly.vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/serving.py#L109— the frontend request id isf"{self.request_id_prefix}-{self._base_request_id(raw_request)}".vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py#L211—flash_late_interaction()(at L191) derives worker cache keys directly from that id:query_keys = [f"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}" for i in range(n_queries)].vllm/v1/pool/late_interaction.py#L30-L36— the data-parallel routing helper pins all requests sharing aquery_keyto the same engine viacrc32(query_key), making collisions deterministic.vllm/v1/worker/gpu/pool/late_interaction_runner.py#L95— the worker stores query embeddings in a process-local cache keyed only by that string:self._query_cache[query_key] = output.clone().
The caller-controlled header enters as the request id, and the flash late-interaction path derives the worker cache key directly from it:
# vllm/entrypoints/serve/engine/serving.py Lines 116-126
@staticmethod
def _base_request_id(
raw_request: Request | None, default: str | None = None
) -> str | None:
"""Pulls the request id to use from a header, if provided"""
if raw_request is not None and (
(req_id := raw_request.headers.get("X-Request-Id")) is not None
):
return req_id
return random_uuid() if default is None else default
# vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py Lines 207-212
n_queries = ctx.n_queries
n_docs = len(ctx.engine_inputs) - n_queries
query_engine_inputs = ctx.engine_inputs[:n_queries]
query_keys = [f"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}" for i in range(n_queries)]
query_uses = [n_docs if n_queries == 1 else 1] * n_queries
The worker then stores and reads the query embedding under that string with no check that the reader owns the entry — a colliding key returns another request's cached query, or (once the use counter is exhausted) raises a cache-miss error:
# vllm/v1/worker/gpu/pool/late_interaction_runner.py Lines 91-107
if mode == LATE_INTERACTION_MODE_CACHE_QUERY:
assert query_uses is not None
# `output` can be a view into the current step's hidden-states
# buffer, so clone it before storing across scheduling steps.
self._query_cache[query_key] = output.clone()
self._query_uses[query_key] = query_uses
outputs[i] = torch.zeros((), device=output.device, dtype=torch.float32)
continue
if mode == LATE_INTERACTION_MODE_SCORE_DOC:
query_output = self._query_cache.get(query_key)
if query_output is None:
raise ValueError(
"late-interaction query cache miss for key "
f"{query_key!r}. Ensure query requests are executed "
"before their paired document requests."
)
The bug is specific to the flash late-interaction path. Non-flash late-interaction scoring computes MaxSim directly from one request's in-memory outputs and does not create a cross-request worker cache key.
Impact
A network client of the standard scoring API can, on a flash late-interaction /score or /rerank deployment:
- Corrupt another user's results — by reusing the victim's
X-Request-Id, the attacker's query embedding overwrites the victim's cached entry, so the victim's documents are scored against the attacker's query (a cross-request integrity break). - Induce errors — depending on timing, one request consumes the shared use counter and forces the other request into a late-interaction cache-miss error.
Both consequences follow deterministically from reusing the victim's header value, because same-key work is pinned to one engine. This is reachable through normal request handling and does not depend on any trusted inter-node network.
Suggested Fix
Derive the flash late-interaction query-cache key from a server-generated, unforgeable per-request identifier (a random_uuid() namespace) rather than the caller-supplied X-Request-Id, and thread that key through the PoolingServeContext to the doc-scoring pass so both passes reuse the same key and a caller cannot address another request's cache entry.
In vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py, the encode-queries pass mints a fresh namespace and stashes the keys on the context:
- query_keys = [f"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}" for i in range(n_queries)]
+ query_namespace = random_uuid()
+ query_keys = [
+ f"late-interaction-{query_namespace}-query-{i}" for i in range(n_queries)
+ ]
+ ctx.late_interaction_query_keys = query_keys
and the encode-docs pass reads those stored keys instead of re-deriving them from ctx.request_id:
- query_keys = [f"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}" for i in range(n_queries)]
+ query_keys = ctx.late_interaction_query_keys
+ if query_keys is None:
+ raise RuntimeError("Late-interaction query keys were not initialized.")
This requires adding the late_interaction_query_keys: list[str] | None = None field to PoolingServeContext (vllm/entrypoints/pooling/typing.py). Because the namespace is a server-generated UUID, colliding X-Request-Id values no longer produce a shared cache key; a regression test asserting exactly that (colliding request ids yield distinct query-cache keys) accompanies the change.
Credit
Reported by: Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration)
This vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative.
Proposed fix: a fix for this issue is proposed in a public pull request: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51445
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| vllm | < 0.30.0 |
0.30.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
vllm PyPI → 0.30.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "vllm>=0.30.0"- poetry
poetry add "vllm>=0.30.0"- uv
uv add "vllm>=0.30.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 4.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
- Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-8397-8qf6-f2gm vLLM: Phi-4 multimodal audio encoder materializes and retains full attention matrices: a single max-length audio OOM-crashes the vLLM engine | Medium | Also affects vllm |
| GHSA-x567-49g5-p4cf vLLM: Responses API bypasses trust_request_chat_template for chat_template_kwargs | Medium | Also affects vllm |
| GHSA-vvpg-rrww-wpmh vLLM: Permissive default CORS origins allow cross-origin requests to the vLLM HTTP server | Medium | Also affects vllm |
| GHSA-q97c-p368-75c4 vLLM: Out-of-vocabulary prompt token id passes input validation and triggers a CUDA device-side assert (engine crash / DoS) | Medium | Also affects vllm |
| GHSA-h3rc-j82p-2c3h vLLM: Untrusted EPS inputs can trigger denial of service or Ghostscript RCE | High | Also affects vllm |
| GHSA-gq5q-89c7-vhvx vLLM DeepSeek-OCR image processing vulnerable to denial of service | Medium | Also affects vllm |
| GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled | High | Also affects vllm |
| GHSA-542m-9234-8gvf vLLM: DoS via unbounded chat_template Jinja2 rendering exhausts the renderer thread pool | Medium | Also affects vllm |
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