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GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759

OpenClaw's commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From

High npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Fix
2026.2.23
Upgrade openclaw to this version or later

Description

Summary

commands.allowFrom is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include ctx.From (conversation identity) as a sender candidate.

When commands.allowFrom contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord channel:<id> or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.22-2
  • Patched version: 2026.2.23 (released)

Details

Root cause: resolveSenderCandidates() in src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts always included ctx.From in candidate evaluation used by commands.allowFrom authorization checks.

ctx.From is sender-like in some direct-message contexts, but conversation-like in channel/group/thread contexts. This mixed principal handling allowed conversation identifiers to satisfy sender-only authorization.

Impact

In affected versions, command/directive authorization could become broader than intended when operators configured commands.allowFrom with conversation identifiers, allowing unintended users in that conversation to run command-only/directive-only flows.

Fix

Main branch now treats commands.allowFrom as sender-only:

  • ctx.From is no longer included as a general sender candidate.
  • ctx.From is only used as fallback when sender fields are absent and the value is not conversation-shaped.
  • Regression tests were added for conversation-id denial and direct-message fallback preservation.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the released version (2026.2.23). This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.

OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
openclaw
< 2026.2.23
2026.2.23

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openclaw npm → 2026.2.23

npm
npm install openclaw@2026.2.23
yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.2.23
pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.2.23

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
  • Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
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