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GHSA-26p8-2jq9-3vq9 CVE-2026-116692

MLflow vulnerable to remote code execution on unauthenticated servers via third-party scorer deserialization importing caller-placed artifact modules

Critical PyPI
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.70%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 53.34% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Fix
3.17.0
Upgrade mlflow to this version or later

Description

Summary

MLflow 3.12.0 introduced registration and deserialization support for third-party scorers in OSS MLflow. During scorer deserialization, the server accepts a request-controlled Python module path beneath one of four allowed package prefixes, imports that module, obtains a request-controlled class, and instantiates it synchronously.

An HTTP caller can combine this behavior with MLflow's built-in experiment, run, and artifact-upload endpoints:

  1. Create an experiment whose local artifact location points to a writable allowed scorer package.
  2. Create a run, causing MLflow to allocate <artifact_location>/<run_id>/artifacts/.
  3. Upload a Python module into that run artifact directory.
  4. Submit a serialized third-party scorer whose module path resolves to the uploaded file.
  5. Trigger server-side import and class construction through /ajax-api/3.0/mlflow/scorer/invoke.

On the default no-auth server using the official MLflow v3.14.0 image, this produces unauthenticated arbitrary Python code execution with the privileges of the MLflow server process. The reproduced image runs the process as uid 0 and permits writes to its installed Python package tree.

The attached proof of concept is intentionally harmless. The uploaded constructor performs one action only: it writes a random marker beside its own uploaded run artifact. The marker is then downloaded through MLflow's run-artifact endpoint and checked for an exact match.

Technical details

1. The allow-list accepts attacker-created descendants

At release commit 86cd7f5a1dc25a1387ad07c87811bbc30f62951c, mlflow/genai/scorers/scorer_utils.py defines these allowed roots:

THIRD_PARTY_SCORER_ALLOWED_MODULES = frozenset({
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.ragas",
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.deepeval",
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens",
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.phoenix",
})

In mlflow/genai/scorers/base.py, the deserializer accepts either an exact root or any descendant:

module_path == m or module_path.startswith(m + ".")

It then performs the following operations using request-controlled values:

module = importlib.import_module(module_path)
scorer_class = getattr(module, class_name, None)
scorer_instance = scorer_class(**init_kwargs)

A package-name prefix is not a provenance boundary. If the server process can write below an allowed package, an attacker-created descendant can satisfy the string-prefix check and become importable Python code.

Relevant source locations at the v3.14.0 release commit:

  • mlflow/genai/scorers/scorer_utils.py, allowed third-party scorer modules
  • mlflow/genai/scorers/base.py, third-party scorer deserialization and construction

2. Deserialization occurs before trace processing

In mlflow/server/handlers.py, _invoke_scorer_handler() parses the supplied serialized scorer and calls:

scorer = Scorer.model_validate_json(serialized_scorer)

Only after deserialization and construction does the handler call:

batches = get_trace_batches_for_scorer(trace_ids, scorer, tracking_store)

The attacker-controlled constructor therefore runs before the server validates or resolves the supplied trace IDs.

The minimal proof class is deliberately not a complete MLflow scorer. After its constructor writes the marker, later trace-batching logic accesses scorer attributes that the proof class does not implement. The resulting HTTP 500 occurs after code execution and does not invalidate the proof.

No background job execution or special job-execution server option is required to reach the constructor.

3. MLflow's artifact layout places the module under the trusted prefix

The experiment creation endpoint accepts an artifact_location. For file-backed experiments, MLflow derives each run artifact directory as:

<artifact_location>/<run_id>/artifacts/

The proof of concept selects this package directory in the official v3.14.0 image:

file:///usr/local/lib/python3.10/site-packages/mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens

After creating a run and uploading audit_<token>.py, the resulting filesystem location is:

/usr/local/lib/python3.10/site-packages/mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens/<run_id>/artifacts/audit_<token>.py

The corresponding import path is:

mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens.<run_id>.artifacts.audit_<token>

The attack does not overwrite an existing package module. It creates a new run-scoped module in the normal file-backed artifact layout. The run ID is returned to the caller.

4. Authentication and authorization behavior

With authentication disabled, as in the default reproduced server configuration, no credentials are required.

When MLflow basic authentication is enabled, authentication still applies. However, the scorer-invocation AJAX endpoint is assigned to validate_gateway_proxy, which returns True without performing an experiment- or scorer-level resource permission check.

Practical exploitation in an authenticated deployment still requires the caller to create an experiment and run and upload artifacts to them. The key authorization issue is that scorer deserialization itself is not gated by a resource-specific permission check for the supplied experiment before the import occurs.

Proof of concept

The attached reproduction is intentionally isolated:

  • exact official MLflow v3.14.0 image pinned by manifest digest;
  • Docker network disabled;
  • MLflow bound to container loopback;
  • no shell command or external callback;
  • no external request;
  • no host filesystem write;
  • marker created beside the uploaded run artifact;
  • marker retrieved through the run-artifact download endpoint; and
  • disposable container removed after completion.

Run:

./run-official-image.sh

Expected output:

MLFLOW_VERSION=3.14.0
PACKAGE_DIR=/usr/local/lib/python3.10/site-packages/mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens
CREATE_EXPERIMENT_STATUS=200
CREATE_RUN_STATUS=200
UPLOAD_STATUS=200
INVOKE_STATUS=500
PROOF_DOWNLOAD_STATUS=200
PROOF_MATCH=1
RESULT=AFFECTED

The security-relevant result is:

PROOF_MATCH=1
RESULT=AFFECTED

This proves that the attacker-controlled constructor executed in the MLflow server process before the later scorer-processing failure.

Reproduction environment

  • Release: MLflow v3.14.0
  • Release commit: 86cd7f5a1dc25a1387ad07c87811bbc30f62951c
  • Official image: ghcr.io/mlflow/mlflow:v3.14.0
  • Manifest digest: sha256:967de3ca34b6a5751718e380a0a383eb0ce1a6f5b484f363bd0da7559117a5f8
  • Python version: 3.10.18
  • Image-configured user: empty
  • Observed runtime user: uid 0
  • Server bind: 127.0.0.1:5000
  • Container network: disabled
  • Backend store: sqlite:////work/mlflow.db
  • Default artifact root: /work/artifacts
  • Authentication: disabled
  • Special job-execution option: none

Server command inside the disposable container:

mlflow server \
  --host 127.0.0.1 \
  --port 5000 \
  --backend-store-uri sqlite:////work/mlflow.db \
  --default-artifact-root /work/artifacts

Affected range and source lineage

The vulnerable third-party scorer deserialization behavior was introduced by commit:

02eea26035b9d8e65af31e6e8f058ca195f62cdd
Enable third-party scorer registration in OSS MLflow (#22634)

The feature is absent from v3.11.1 and first appears in v3.12.0.

Runtime reproduction succeeds on v3.14.0. The relevant mlflow/genai/scorers/base.py content is unchanged at master commit:

20858c9426a9644dfcf9545a92cbb534376779eb

No fixed release was identified as of 2026-07-12.

Impact

On the reproduced stock no-auth image, any network caller who can reach the tracking server can execute Python code as the MLflow process without credentials or user interaction.

Successful exploitation provides confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact over all data, credentials, network access, and filesystem locations available to the MLflow server process.

The stock image's runtime uid 0 increases container-level impact. Host impact still depends on the container runtime configuration, mounted paths, granted capabilities, socket exposure, and other isolation controls.

In authentication-enabled deployments, exploitation requires an authenticated principal capable of creating an experiment and run and uploading artifacts. The exact chain also requires the server process to be able to write beneath one of the allowed scorer packages. This condition holds in the reproduced official image and may hold in virtual environments installed and run by the same operating-system user.

A read-only container filesystem or a scorer package directory owned by a different, non-writable user blocks this exact placement chain.

Artifacts and attachments

Remote proof-of-concept script

POC Script: new_remote_poc.py

The remote proof of concept was then executed as follows. The disposable machine’s public IP has been redacted:

python3 new_remote_poc.py \
  --target http://<REDACTED_PUBLIC_IP> \
  --package-dir /usr/local/lib/python3.10/site-packages/mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens \
  --acknowledge-owned-target I_OWN_THIS_TARGET

The complete sanitized output was:

TARGET=http://<REDACTED_PUBLIC_IP>
VERSION_STATUS=200
MLFLOW_VERSION=3.14.0
CREATE_EXPERIMENT_STATUS=200
EXPERIMENT_ID=2
CREATE_RUN_STATUS=200
RUN_ID=9a2d665eb38940b68983f0586f623115
UPLOAD_STATUS=200
IMPORT_PATH=mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens.9a2d665eb38940b68983f0586f623115.artifacts.audit_1783843760683972103
INVOKE_STATUS=500
INVOKE_RESPONSE_PREVIEW='<!doctype html>\n<html lang=en>\n<title>500 Internal Server Error</title>\n<h1>Internal Server Error</h1>\n<p>The server encountered an internal error and was unable to complete your request. Either the server is overloaded or there is an error in the application.</p>\n'
PROOF_DOWNLOAD_STATUS=200
EXPECTED_MARKER_SHA256=7a423b479df3524567fdf8cc3e7f6c4bfccc577fbcc4bac9519db8bd1cc61ed5
PROOF_MATCH=1
SERVER_CLEANUP_PATH=/usr/local/lib/python3.10/site-packages/mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens/9a2d665eb38940b68983f0586f623115
PROOF_OUTPUT_BEGIN
{
  "cwd": "/",
  "machine": "x86_64",
  "marker": "MLFLOW_REMOTE_SAFE_MARKER_1783843760683972103",
  "os_release": "PRETTY_NAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)\"\nNAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux\"\nVERSION_ID=\"11\"\nVERSION=\"11 (bullseye)\"\nVERSION_CODENAME=bullseye\nID=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/support\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.debian.org/\"\n",
  "platform": "Linux-7.0.0-1006-aws-x86_64-with-glibc2.31",
  "python_implementation": "CPython",
  "python_version": "3.10.18",
  "server_datetime_utc": "2026-07-12T08:09:43.555055+00:00",
  "whoami": "root",
  "whoami_returncode": 0,
  "whoami_stderr": ""
}
PROOF_OUTPUT_END
RESULT=AFFECTED
EXPERIMENT_METADATA_CLEANUP_STATUS=200
CLEANUP_NOTE=discard the temporary test instance or remove SERVER_CLEANUP_PATH on the owned host

The proof file was also verified directly inside the disposable container:

cat /usr/local/lib/python3.10/site-packages/mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens/9a2d665eb38940b68983f0586f623115/artifacts/execution-proof-1783843760683972103.json

The file contained:

{
  "cwd": "/",
  "machine": "x86_64",
  "marker": "MLFLOW_REMOTE_SAFE_MARKER_1783843760683972103",
  "os_release": "PRETTY_NAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)\"\nNAME=\"Debian GNU/Linux\"\nVERSION_ID=\"11\"\nVERSION=\"11 (bullseye)\"\nVERSION_CODENAME=bullseye\nID=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://www.debian.org/support\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.debian.org/\"\n",
  "platform": "Linux-7.0.0-1006-aws-x86_64-with-glibc2.31",
  "python_implementation": "CPython",
  "python_version": "3.10.18",
  "server_datetime_utc": "2026-07-12T08:09:43.555055+00:00",
  "whoami": "root",
  "whoami_returncode": 0,
  "whoami_stderr": ""
}

The results demonstrate that:

  • the attacker-controlled module was uploaded beneath an allowed scorer package;
  • MLflow imported the request-selected module and invoked its constructor;
  • the constructor executed as the MLflow server process, which ran as root in the reproduced official image;
  • the constructor created a server-side proof file containing a random marker and bounded runtime information;
  • the proof file was retrieved successfully through MLflow’s artifact-download endpoint; and
  • the later HTTP 500 occurred only after constructor execution.

The authoritative reproduction indicators are:

UPLOAD_STATUS=200
PROOF_DOWNLOAD_STATUS=200
PROOF_MATCH=1
RESULT=AFFECTED

The disposable cloud machine and container were removed after testing.

Local Reproduction Scripts: run-official-image.sh poc_local.py

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
mlflow
>= 3.12.0rc0, < 3.17.0
3.17.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

mlflow PyPI → 3.17.0

pip
pip install --upgrade "mlflow>=3.17.0"
poetry
poetry add "mlflow>=3.17.0"
uv
uv add "mlflow>=3.17.0"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')

The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Refactor your code to avoid using reflection.
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use user-controlled inputs to select and load classes or code.
  • Implementation: Apply strict input validation by using allowlists or indirect selection to ensure that the user is only selecting allowable classes or code.

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
  • Architecture and Design: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
  • Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-7gwp-5pfp-969j
MLflow: Unauthenticated full-read SSRF in webhook delivery: _validate_webhook_url bypassed via unvalidated HTTP redirects (and DNS rebinding)
Critical Known exploited Also affects mlflow
GHSA-j7qq-vr8c-xvw3
MLflow CrewAI autologging records LLM provider API keys in logged trace spans
Medium Also affects mlflow
GHSA-m65p-9j7q-6w33
MLflow vulnerable to arbitrary file read on unauthenticated servers via prompt model version source
High Also affects mlflow
GHSA-2wqp-q3c6-ccj5
MLflow: SSRF on unauthenticated MLflow servers via third-party scorer kwargs in the scorer invoke, register, and GenAI evaluate endpoints
Medium Also affects mlflow
GHSA-wqmh-qccw-pqwf
MLflow FileStore trace IDs allow path traversal and arbitrary file writes
High Also affects mlflow
GHSA-gqvg-gmmx-x4hm
MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION=False safety control bypassed by mlflow.statsmodels flavor — RCE via crafted model artifact
High Also affects mlflow
GHSA-h7x2-h6g9-p789
MLflow AI Gateway permits SSRF through an unvalidated api_base
High Also affects mlflow
GHSA-2cm6-r77w-6g96
MLflow: trace API endpoints lack proper authorization validators
High Also affects mlflow
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