EEF-CVE-2026-97200 CVE-2026-97200
Unbounded response body buffering and decompression in hackney
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Unknown · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.56%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 46.87% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
- CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- Fix
4.9.0- Upgrade hackney to this version or later
Description
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in hackney_conn in benoitc hackney allows a malicious HTTP server to exhaust client memory via an oversized or highly compressed response body. hackney:request/5 and hackney:body/1 return the whole response body, and nothing bounds how much the connection process buffers. Any server the client requests can trigger it.
hackney_conn:read_full_body/2 and the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 accumulators append every chunk until the body ends. With {auto_decompress, true} the buffered body is then inflated in one step with zlib:gunzip/1 or zlib:inflate/2, which return the whole output at once.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0-beta.1 before 4.9.0.
Details
1. Unbounded accumulation. hackney:request/5 with a body, and hackney:body/1 after start_response/1, read the response in src/hackney_conn.erl through read_full_body/2, which appends each chunk to a binary accumulator until the body ends. The HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 synchronous paths accumulate stream data the same way. No option caps the size.
2. One-step decompression. With {auto_decompress, true} hackney sends Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate. Once the body is complete, maybe_decompress_body/2 dispatches on Content-Encoding to decompress_gzip/1 (zlib:gunzip/1) or decompress_deflate/1 (zlib:inflate/2). Both return the whole output at once, so the inflated size is bounded only by the compression ratio. The report measured a 1 MB gzip body inflating to 1 GB on hackney 4.8.4.
Proof of concept
- Build a gzip stream whose inflated size is 1 GB from a reused 64 KB chunk of zero bytes (deflate with window bits 31, best compression). The stream is about 1 MB on the wire.
- Start a TCP listener on loopback that accepts one connection, reads the request, and answers
HTTP/1.1 200 OKwithContent-Encoding: gzip, aContent-Lengthmatching the stream,Connection: close, and the stream as body. - From a node running a vulnerable hackney, call
hackney:request(get, Url, [], <<>>, [{auto_decompress, true}, with_body])against that listener. - Observe the returned body of 1,048,576,000 bytes and the VM memory growing by about 1.8 GB for a 1,019,197 byte response. A larger stream, or an endless body without
auto_decompress, drives the node out of memory.
Impact
A server the client requests can make the client allocate memory proportional to the body it sends, or to its decompressed size, until the node runs out of memory.
Workarounds
Leave auto_decompress disabled (the default). Without it hackney_conn:maybe_decompress_body/2 never inflates the body, which closes the amplification half. The uncapped raw body read has no workaround.
Affected versions
Hex
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hackney | >= 2.0.0-beta.1, < 4.9.0 |
4.9.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
hackney Hex → 4.9.0
- mix
{:hackney, "~> 4.9.0"} # then: mix deps.update hackney
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
- Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| EEF-CVE-2026-115693 Custom cacerts or cacertfile do not restrict trust to the pinned CA in hackney | Not rated yet | Also affects hackney |
| EEF-CVE-2026-113440 HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 redirects resend basic_auth and cookie to a different scheme or port in hackney | Not rated yet | Also affects hackney |
| EEF-CVE-2026-115700 SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney | Not rated yet | Also affects hackney |
| EEF-CVE-2026-112880 CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney | Not rated yet | Also affects hackney |
| EEF-CVE-2026-47073 Unbounded memory consumption in WebSocket client in hackney | High | Also affects hackney |
| EEF-CVE-2026-47067 Atom table exhaustion via unrecognized URL schemes in hackney | High | Also affects hackney |
| EEF-CVE-2026-47072 CRLF injection in WebSocket upgrade request in hackney | High | Also affects hackney |
| EEF-CVE-2026-47076 SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded host in hackney | Medium | Also affects hackney |
Credits: Benoit Chesneau, Jonatan Männchen / EEF, Martin Karrer, Quinn Wilton
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