Skip to content

EEF-CVE-2026-66882 CVE-2026-66882 GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw

Reflected XSS in AshAuthentication confirmation and magic link interaction forms

Not rated yet Hex
Severity
0.0 / 10
Unknown · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.75%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 54.95% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Fix
5.0.0-rc.13
Upgrade ash_authentication to this version or later

Description

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows reflected cross-site scripting via the confirmation and magic link interaction forms.

When a strategy is configured with require_interaction? set to true, AshAuthentication serves an intermediate HTML page asking the user to confirm the action by submitting a form. Both such pages embed a request parameter directly into a hidden input's value attribute without HTML escaping: lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/confirmation/confirmation_form.html.eex interpolates the confirm parameter, and lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_form.html.eex interpolates the magic link token parameter. These templates are compiled with EEx.function_from_file/3 using plain <%= %> expressions, which perform no escaping, so the parameter is reflected verbatim.

Neither accept handler validates the value before rendering it. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Plug.accept/2 only checks that a confirm key is present, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.Plug.accept/2 reads the parameter directly, so no token signature is verified at this stage and arbitrary attacker-supplied text reaches the template. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore craft a URL whose parameter terminates the attribute and injects markup, for example a quote followed by a <script> element. Because the accept phase is served over GET, loading the crafted link is sufficient; no form submission or prior authentication is required.

The injected script executes in the origin of the application embedding AshAuthentication, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Since these pages are part of the authentication flow, a victim following what appears to be a legitimate confirmation or sign-in link is a plausible target.

This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.

Configurations

Only strategies configured with require_interaction? set to true are affected. This option defaults to false, and when it is disabled the vulnerable accept route is not registered at all, so the affected pages cannot be reached.

The option is not obscure: AshAuthentication's own documentation for the confirmation add-on advises that applications using AshAuthenticationPhoenix should enable it, so the affected configuration is a documented and recommended deployment rather than an unusual one.

At least one of the following must be configured with require_interaction? true:

  • the confirmation add-on, which serves the affected confirmation accept form; or
  • the magic_link strategy, which serves the affected sign-in accept form.

Affected versions

Hex

PackageVulnerableFixed in
ash_authentication
>= 4.8.0, < 4.14.2
>= 5.0.0-rc.0, < 5.0.0-rc.13
4.14.2
5.0.0-rc.13

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

ash_authentication Hex → 5.0.0-rc.13

mix
{:ash_authentication, "~> 5.0.0-rc.13"} # then: mix deps.update ash_authentication

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Active
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
Low
Integrity (subsequent systems)
Low
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: HTML body Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") URIs JavaScript sections Cascading Style Sheets and style property etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Implementation: Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
  • Implementation: With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
  • Implementation: To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most ef
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
EEF-CVE-2026-86688
Session id is not renewed on authentication in ash_authentication, allowing session fixation
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication
EEF-CVE-2026-76949
Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication
EEF-CVE-2026-91039
dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication
EEF-CVE-2026-88952
OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication
EEF-CVE-2026-85500
`require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication
EEF-CVE-2026-86533
Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication
EEF-CVE-2026-81632
Single-use sign-in token placed in a redirect query string in AshAuthenticationPhoenix
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication
EEF-CVE-2026-80218
Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication
Not rated yet Also affects ash_authentication

Credits: Arpit Jain, James Harton, Jonatan Männchen / EEF

Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor