CVE-2026-113708

Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes.

Critical

Severity: 9.9 / 10; Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.67%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 51.86% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
Fix: None yet; No fixed version published

Description

Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes. From 2.7.0 until 3.3.15, 3.4.10, 3.5.4, and 3.6.0-rc2, Kustomize passes ref or version query values from remote resource, base, or component URLs to git fetch without an end-of-options separator. A leading-hyphen value can be parsed as --upload-pack and execute a command inside argocd-repo-server when the remote uses a local transport such as file://. Git does not run the supplied command for an https:// remote. The local transport does not leave the pod, so blocking repo-server egress does not prevent the execution. The command runs as the repo-server user, can read repository credentials and other process-accessible data, and can return output through manifest-generation errors. An attacker can commit a Kustomization to a Git repository that an Application builds or upload files through POST /api/v1/applications/manifestsWithFiles, also exposed by argocd app diff --local --server-side-generate. The upload path requires only Application get permission on an existing Application, without Application update or sync permission or repository write access. Kustomize 5.0.0 introduced acceptance of file://, whereas 4.5.7 rejects that transport; replacing the affected Kustomize with a newer version alone does not correct the missing option separator. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.15, 3.4.10, 3.5.4, and 3.6.0-rc2.

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Weakness

CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.

How to prevent it

Implementation: Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.
Architecture and Design: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

References

Timeline

Oct 20, 2026 Published
Oct 20, 2026 Last updated by the source
Nov 1, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors	Medium	Same weakness, CWE-88
GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh Pillow: Argument Injection in Ghostscript call, potentially leading into RCE	Critical	Same weakness, CWE-88
GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2 GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-78679)	High	Same weakness, CWE-88
GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239 GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution	Critical	Same weakness, CWE-88
GHSA-rw58-wc66-99g4 Duplicate Advisory: GitPython 3.1.59: --no-index bypasses diff unsafe-option protections and enables a blind local-file content oracle	Medium	Same weakness, CWE-88
CVE-2026-86060 RouterOS contains an argument-handling flaw in the SSH login path involving usernames that begin with a prohibited character, allowing for the trusted RouterOS…	Critical Known exploited	Same weakness, CWE-88
GHSA-m4rf-3fr8-xwx3 NLTK: JVM argument injection bypass via per-call options in the NLTK Stanford wrappers (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-12841)	Critical	Same weakness, CWE-88
GHSA-3wxw-xv34-2frg GitPython: TagReference.create positional reference bypasses kwargs-only --file guard, enabling arbitrary file read (incomplete fix of 3af0c251)	High	Same weakness, CWE-88

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