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CVE-2026-111357

Ivanti Connect Secure 22.8R2.4 mishandles the manner in which the dsinvoked broker trusts DSCache configuration data, leading to privilege escalation to root,…

High Known exploited
Severity
7.0 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.53%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 45.03% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
Yes
In CISA's catalog since Oct 30, 2026
Weakness
CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published
Exploited in the wild. Ivanti Connect Secure Missing Authentication for Critical Function Vulnerability (Ivanti Connect Secure). Required action: Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines. Due for U.S. federal agencies by Nov 2, 2026.

Description

Ivanti Connect Secure 22.8R2.4 mishandles the manner in which the dsinvoked broker trusts DSCache configuration data, leading to privilege escalation to root, as exploited in the wild in October 2026.

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. Many file inclusion problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, especially for cookies and URL components.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
  3. Latest EPSS score
  4. Last updated by the source
  5. Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
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CVE-2026-113709
Argo CD is a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes.
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High Same weakness, CWE-829
GHSA-jj74-hc2q-xrvm
Ghost: Remote Code Execution via Theme Translation Files
High Same weakness, CWE-829
GHSA-c48m-32m9-vx93
vm2 Custom Module Resolver Can Bypass the External Package Allowlist by Loading a Colliding Host Package
Critical Same weakness, CWE-829
GHSA-jxxv-8r27-vm4p
vm2 CLI provides no sandbox isolation - host-realm require() is reachable from sandboxed scripts
Critical Same weakness, CWE-829
GHSA-9mrh-pw7c-9mqm
Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-62902 – .NET Information Disclosure Vulnerability
Medium Same weakness, CWE-829
EEF-CVE-2026-66843
html_sanitize_ex HTML5 scrubber keeps attacker-supplied `<object>` elements, allowing untrusted content embedding
Medium Same weakness, CWE-829
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