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CVE-2024-20953

Vulnerability in the Oracle Agile PLM product of Oracle Supply Chain (component: Export).

High Known exploited
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
3.93%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 90.38% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
Yes
In CISA's catalog since Feb 24, 2025
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published
Exploited in the wild. Oracle Agile Product Lifecycle Management (PLM) Deserialization Vulnerability (Oracle Agile Product Lifecycle Management (PLM)). Required action: Apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Due for U.S. federal agencies by Mar 17, 2025.

Description

Vulnerability in the Oracle Agile PLM product of Oracle Supply Chain (component: Export). The supported version that is affected is 9.3.6. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Agile PLM. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Agile PLM. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
  3. Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
  4. Last updated by the source
  5. Latest EPSS score
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