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CVE-2023-6448

Unitronics VisiLogic before version 9.9.00, used in Vision and Samba PLCs and HMIs, uses a default administrative password.

Critical Known exploited
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
2.09%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 81.61% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
Yes
In CISA's catalog since Dec 11, 2023
Weakness
CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published
Exploited in the wild. Unitronics Vision PLC and HMI Insecure Default Password Vulnerability (Unitronics Vision PLC and HMI). Required action: Apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Due for U.S. federal agencies by Dec 18, 2023.

Description

Unitronics VisiLogic before version 9.9.00, used in Vision and Samba PLCs and HMIs, uses a default administrative password. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can take administrative control of a vulnerable system.

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default

The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure.

CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
  • Architecture and Design: If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
  • Architecture and Design: For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
  3. Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
  4. Last updated by the source
  5. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-9qh4-3jw8-366w
Electron: <webview> can enable Node.js integration in Web Workers despite embedder restrictions
Critical Same weakness, CWE-1188
GHSA-jxxv-8r27-vm4p
vm2 CLI provides no sandbox isolation - host-realm require() is reachable from sandboxed scripts
Critical Same weakness, CWE-1188
GHSA-p3m8-78j2-g5p3
NLTK: Default ENFORCE=False Disables All pathsec Security Controls
High Same weakness, CWE-1188
GHSA-xr9x-r78c-5hrm
Active Storage has possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in Active Storage variant processing
Critical Same weakness, CWE-1188
GHSA-jr9p-4h4j-6c58
Kimai: Default APP_SECRET in Docker Image Enables Cookie Forgery and Account Takeover
Critical Same weakness, CWE-1188
GHSA-fj8f-m44g-c479
PraisonAI: Prompt Injection Defense Bypassed for HIGH-Level Threats
High Same weakness, CWE-1188
GHSA-9h47-pqcx-hjr4
Better Auth has insecure cryptographic defaults in oidcProvider: alg=none advertised and plain PKCE accepted by default
Critical Same weakness, CWE-1188
GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML()
Critical Same weakness, CWE-1188
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