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GHSA-w7pm-cc4v-f3g8 GHSA-w7pm-cc4v-f3g8

Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Liferay Portal

Critical Known exploited Maven
Severity
9.3 / 10
Critical · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
99.91%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 99.97% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
Yes
In CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
4.35.3
Upgrade com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel to this version or later

Description

Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Liferay Portal prior to 7.2.1 CE GA2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via JSON web services (JSONWS).

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel
< 4.35.3
4.35.3
com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel
< 4.35.3
4.35.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel Maven → 4.35.3

maven
<dependency><groupId>com.liferay.portal</groupId><artifactId>com.liferay.portal.kernel</artifactId><version>4.35.3</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel:4.35.3")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 9.3

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:A

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Attacked

CVSS 3.1 9.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
Exploit maturity
H

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xvgg-9h29-4g34
Liferay Portal has Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
High Also affects com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel
GHSA-43h9-p3j4-39hm
Liferay Portal defaults to a low work factor for the default password hashing algorithm
High Also affects com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel
CVE-2026-110879
jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes…
Critical Same weakness, CWE-502
GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w
vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled
High Same weakness, CWE-502
GHSA-673q-mjm6-r5xr
Next.js: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in `use cache` functions returning typed arrays
Critical Same weakness, CWE-502
GHSA-c27m-942f-rcfh
Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-87697 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
High Same weakness, CWE-502
GHSA-4w5f-7jp2-w48g
Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-83520 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
High Same weakness, CWE-502
GHSA-4j9v-h7pp-725h
Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-70035 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
High Same weakness, CWE-502

Credits: amuravski, liefke

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