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CVE-2020-3118

A vulnerability in the Cisco Discovery Protocol implementation for Cisco IOS XR Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary…

High Known exploited
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
11.68%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 96.06% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
Yes
In CISA's catalog since Nov 3, 2021
Weakness
CWE-134 Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published
Exploited in the wild. Cisco IOS XR Software Discovery Protocol Format String Vulnerability (Cisco IOS XR). Required action: Apply updates per vendor instructions. Due for U.S. federal agencies by May 3, 2022.

Description

A vulnerability in the Cisco Discovery Protocol implementation for Cisco IOS XR Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a reload on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of string input from certain fields in Cisco Discovery Protocol messages. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious Cisco Discovery Protocol packet to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a stack overflow, which could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code with administrative privileges on an affected device. Cisco Discovery Protocol is a Layer 2 protocol. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be in the same broadcast domain as the affected device (Layer 2 adjacent).

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Adjacent
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-134: Use of Externally-Controlled Format String

The product uses a function that accepts a format string as an argument, but the format string originates from an external source.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Choose a language that is not subject to this flaw.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all format string functions are passed a static string which cannot be controlled by the user, and that the proper number of arguments are always sent to that function as well. If at all possible, use functions that do not support the %n operator in format strings. [REF-116] [REF-117]
  • Build and Compilation: Run compilers and linkers with high warning levels, since they may detect incorrect usage.

CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking. D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
  • Implementation: Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application's memory: Double check that the buffer is as large as specified. When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the string. Check buffer boundaries if accessing the buffer in a loop and make sure there is no danger of writing past the allocated space. If necessary, truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and concatenation functions.
  • Operation, Build and Compilation: Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code. Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking. For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
  • Operation: Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment. For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
  • Implementation: Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
  3. Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
  4. Last updated by the source
  5. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-3m6g-2423-7cp3
Ruby JSON has a format string injection vulnerability
Critical Same weakness, CWE-134
GHSA-w96v-gf22-crwp
n8n: Webhook Node IP Whitelist Bypass via Partial String Matching
Medium Same weakness, CWE-134
GHSA-9ccg-6pjw-x645
ImageMagick has a Format String Bug in InterpretImageFilename leads to arbitrary code execution
High Same weakness, CWE-134
GHSA-q3gg-m8hr-h4x4
Externally Controlled Format String in Scripting Functions
Critical Same weakness, CWE-134
CVE-2024-23113
A use of externally-controlled format string in Fortinet FortiOS versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2, 7.2.0 through 7.2.6, 7.0.0 through 7.0.13, FortiProxy versions…
Critical Known exploited Same weakness, CWE-134
GHSA-5rp4-749p-vx26
Apache Airflow vulnerable to Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
High Same weakness, CWE-134
CVE-2021-25489
Assuming radio permission is gained, missing input validation in modem interface driver prior to SMR Oct-2021 Release 1 results in format string bug leading to…
Medium Known exploited Same weakness, CWE-134
GHSA-qvm7-23cj-437v
Remote Code Execution in Apache Dubbo
Critical Same weakness, CWE-134
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